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 According to leading psychosocial models of worry, the reduced imagery and 
concreteness of worries may prevent emotional processing and ultimately maintain fear. 
Given that Pennebaker’s written emotional disclosure paradigm may facilitate emotional 
processing, the present study investigated whether writing about potential problems about 
which individuals were worried had physical and psychological health benefits similar to 
the benefits of writing about other emotionally meaningful topics (e.g., decreased 
physician visits, reduced symptoms of psychopathology). Participants were randomly 
assigned to write either emotionally or objectively about a potential problem worrying 
them or a neutral topic (a 2 x 2 between-participants design). Each group completed four 
15-min writing sessions on four consecutive days. Physician visits, generalized anxiety 
symptoms, trait worry, and problem appraisals were monitored six weeks before (visits), 
immediately after (all variables), one month after (symptoms, worry, and appraisals), and 
3 months after (visits) writing. Contrary to past research, the present research revealed no 
beneficial effects of written emotional disclosure about potential problems. However, 
among emotional disclosure participants who wrote about the same worry across all four 
writing sessions, there was a subsequent decrease in trait worry scores one month later. 
Affective data suggested that disclosure facilitated slight fear activation and habituation, 
although these effects were small. Potential reasons for these findings and suggestions for 
future research are discussed. 
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Despite its pervasiveness, worry had received little attention from psychological 
researchers until the early 1980s. In fact, some researchers originally questioned whether 
worry was even a useful construct to study (e.g., O’Neill, 1985a,b). For example, O’Neill 
argued that worry is a vague term with many different meanings and is an unreliable 
mental process because it cannot be directly observed. As such, studying worry would 
contribute little to our understanding of human behavior. However, three decades of 
research since O’Neill’s claims have indicated that worry is an important psychological 
construct. Indeed, excessive worry is now considered the central feature of generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) and is a common feature of all anxiety disorders (Barlow, 1988; 
Borkovec, 1994). Furthermore, research aimed at understanding worry may help to 
improve the effectiveness of treatment for individuals suffering from anxiety disorders. 
But what exactly is meant by the term, “worry”? Based on initial research and 
anecdotal observation, Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, and DePree (1983) offered the 
first formal definition of “worry” as a 
chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in 
mental problem-solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but 
contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes (p. 10). 
Consistent with this definition, phenomenological research has confirmed that worry is an 
attempt to problem-solve (Davey, 1994), although often an ineffective one (Stober, 
Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000). In addition, worry is often uncontrollable and distressing 
(Borkovec, 1994). Also, worry is predominantly negatively affect-laden and focused on 
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future-oriented negative outcomes (Borkovec et al., 1983). Further, research has indicated 
that worry is associated with increased perceived likelihood of negative outcomes 
(MacLeod, 1994; MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian, 1991). However, the claim that 
worries consist of chains of “thoughts and images” has not been fully supported, in that 
researchers have found that worries consist predominantly of thoughts and of a relative 
lack of imagery (Behar & Borkovec, 2002; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; East & Watts, 1994; 
Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996) 
One important question concerns whether individual differences in worry exist in 
a dimensional or a categorical manner. The former notion has guided worry research over 
the past three decades and has begun to receive empirical support. For example, In a 
taxometric investigation of the latent structure of worry, Ruscio, Borkovec, and Ruscio 
(2001) confirmed that nonclinical and clinical worry exist on a continuum—the 
distinction being quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. This distinction is 
important because if worry exists in a dimensional nature, then worry can be studied 
throughout the continuum (i.e., in nonclinical samples) and the findings should be 
relevant to individuals at any point (including the clinical end) of the continuum. Thus, 
the dimensional nature of worry allows researchers to use nonclinical samples and to 
reach conclusions cautiously that may enhance psychopathologists’ understanding of 
GAD. Note that this reasoning does not imply the absence of any differences between 
pathological and nonpathological worriers. Rather, these differences are continuous in 
nature. For instance, relative to non-pathological worriers, pathological worriers report 
their worry to be less controllable (Borkovec, 1994), spend more time engaged in worry 
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(Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 1989), and typically worry about a greater number of 
topics (Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec).  
 The use of nonclinical samples in worry research has led to many important 
findings about the worry process. One robust finding is that although worry is an attempt 
to problem solve, it is a distressing activity that does little to resolve problems (Borkovec, 
1994). This finding leads one to wonder why people do worry. Borkovec and colleagues 
maintain that one reason is that they hold a variety of erroneous beliefs about the benefits 
of worrying (Borkovec et al., 1998; Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, & Diaz, 1999). For 
example, individuals believe that worrying (a) helps them to determine how to prevent 
the occurrence of undesirable events, (b) decreases the chances of something bad 
happening, (c) distracts them from more emotional and distressing topics, (d) helps them 
to prepare for negative experiences, (e) motivates them, and (f) is an effective way to 
problem-solve. In addition, Davey and colleagues have identified two positive beliefs 
about worry that distinguish pathological from nonpathological worriers (Davey, Tallis, 
& Capuzzo, 1996). First, they found that high (but not low) worriers believe in the 
motivational value of worry (e.g., “In order to get something done I have to worry about 
it.”). Second, worriers believe that worry aids analytic thinking (e.g., “Worrying gives me 
the opportunity to analyze situations and work out the pros and cons”; pp. 503-504). 
 There is little evidence that beliefs about the benefits of worry are accurate. First, 
although worriers may believe the non-occurrence of the situations they are worrying 
about indicates that worry successfully prevented the event, this belief is probably 
unfounded. For example, Borkovec et al. (1998) noted that individuals worry about very 
low probability events that usually would not have occurred whether the individual had 
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worried or had not. However, a “superstitious reinforcement paradigm” exists in which 
individuals may attribute the non-occurrence of such events to their worrying (Borkovec 
et al., p. 566). Second, the evidence is at best mixed regarding the notion that worry aids 
in problem solving. Although some studies have found worry and problem solving 
coping to be positively correlated (e.g., Davey, 1993; Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & 
Davidson, 1992), others have found worry to be unrelated to problem solving ability and 
even negatively related to problem solving confidence (e.g., Davey, 1994; Ladouceur, 
Blais, Freeston, & Dugas). Third, Stober et al. provide a compelling theoretical argument 
suggesting that worry should be unlikely to aid problem solving. Specifically, worriers 
usually generate abstract thoughts, whereas successful problem solving may require 
concrete thinking because appropriate definition and analysis of problems are considered 
important steps to problem solving (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). Stober et al. argue that 
these steps are unlikely to be achieved successfully if individuals’ problem elaborations 
or thoughts about potential problems are often vague (rather than concrete). In short, a 
variety of erroneous beliefs about the positive effects of worry may help to explain why 
individuals engage in the seemingly counterproductive process of worrying.  
 Beliefs about the benefits of worry are not, however, the only reason why 
individuals worry. According to Borkovec (1994), they also worry as a form of motivated 
avoidance of distressing imagery. Borkovec and colleagues noted from their clinical 
experience that when individuals worry, their mental content comprises a predominance 
of thoughts and a relative lack of imagery. For example, if an individual is worried about 
failing an exam, thoughts about failing may be less distressing than images of failing 
(e.g., a paper with an “F” in red ink on it), as images about emotional material typically 
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evoke stronger physiological responses than do thoughts about the same material (Vrana, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). Note that Borkovec’s contention is not that imagery is 
completely absent during worry, but rather that thoughts are predominant. In fact, there is 
evidence that imagery and thought activity must occur simultaneously during mentation 
(e.g., Paivio & Marschark, 1991). Rather, Behar and Borkovec (2002) contend that when 
individuals worry, distressing images will inevitably enter their minds on occasion. 
Because distressing imagery increases physiological activity (e.g., Vrana et al.), 
individuals shift to verbal linguistic thought as a means of reducing this distress. Worry 
may then become reinforced due to the short-term gain that it provides by reducing 
emotional distress and/or physiological reactivity to threat-related stimuli (e.g., imagery).  
Despite this short-term gain, reduced physiological distress and avoidance of 
imagery are problematic because they prevent habituation of the anxiety response to the 
stimulus, according to emotional processing theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986). According to 
the theory, emotions are represented by information structures in memory. Emotional 
processing refers to the modification of these memory structures and is considered crucial 
for the reduction or elimination of fear to occur. According to Foa and Kozak, there are 
two necessary conditions for emotional processing: First, the entire fear structure in 
memory must be activated. Second, a change in meaning must occur via exposure to 
incompatible information. Thus, Borkovec has argued that because worry reduces short-
term physiological arousal by helping individuals to avoid processing threatening 
imagery, it prevents the activation of and thus habituation to the feared stimuli 
(Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 1998).  
 6
Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed three indicators of emotional processing during 
psychotherapy. First, increased physiological arousal and self-reported fear indicate the 
activation of the fear structure. For example, individuals who benefited the most from 
exposure (and thus, it is assumed, most fully processed their emotions) in two outcome 
studies showed the greatest increases in heart rates during initial exposure (Borkovec & 
Sides, 1979; Lang, Melamed, & Hart, 1970). Second, when successful emotional 
processing occurs, the arousal upon exposure gradually decreases over time within 
sessions of exposure to feared stimuli. Finally, when emotional processing occurs, 
arousal upon exposure decreases across sessions of exposure (e.g., Foa, Grayson, 
Steketee, Doppelt, Turner, & Latimer, 1983). 
 To test the theory that a function of worry is to avoid aversive imagery, Borkovec 
assigned patients with GAD and nonclinical control participants to relax and then to 
worry for ten minutes each (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). At various intervals, participants 
were asked through an intercom whether their mental content consisted of thoughts, 
images, or both (or whether they were unsure). During worry, both participant groups 
reported the presence of “thoughts” about twice as often as the presence of “images.” 
This pattern was unique to worry in that during relaxation there was a significant 
predominance of images for control participants and an even balance of thoughts and 
images for the GAD patients (see also East & Watts, 1994). Subsequent research has 
revealed that the predominance of thoughts over imagery is also unique to worry in that it 
does not extend to another form of distressing mental content: the recall of traumatic 
experiences, in which imagery is predominant (Behar & Borkovec, 2002). 
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 Although there is now ample evidence that worries do lack imagery, researchers 
have only begun to examine why they do. Stober argues that worries lack imagery 
because they lack concreteness (Stober, 1998, 2000; Stober & Borkovec, 2002). He 
conceptualizes “concrete” thought as being “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, 
clear, singular,” whereas “abstract” thought is “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, 
unclear, aggregated” (p. 231). An example of an abstract thought would be, “I may be a 
failure.” This statement is cross-situational in that the individual has not restricted the 
conclusion that he or she is a failure to only one area or situation but instead has reached 
a broad conclusion about himself or herself. A more concrete corollary thought would be, 
“I may not do well on my biology final exam.” This thought focuses on a situationally 
specific, distinct event and does not reach a broad conclusion about the individual but 
rather only about one particular performance.  
According to cognitive research, the level of concreteness of a thought strongly 
correlates with the degree of imagery associated with it. For example, Pavio and 
Marschark (1991) found that relative to abstract words, concrete words elicit imagery 
more easily, quickly, and vividly. In fact, the concreteness of words and the ease with 
which they elicit imagery correlate at around .80 to .90 (Marschark & Cornoldi, 1991). 
Based on these findings, Stober (1998) speculated that the reduced concreteness of 
individuals’ worries may play an important role in the reduced imagery associated with 
them.  
To test this hypothesis, Stober and Borkovec (2002) examined the concreteness of 
thoughts about potential problems in individuals with high (i.e., participants with GAD) 
versus low (i.e., nonclinical controls) trait worry. Participants were instructed to describe 
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two major problems that they were currently worried about and to elaborate on the 
potential negative consequences associated with the problems. The degree of 
concreteness of individuals’ elaborations of the negative consequences was assessed. As 
expected, the problem elaborations of high worriers were significantly less concrete than 
those of low worriers. Furthermore, after successful treatment, the worries of the patients 
were comparable in concreteness to those of the nonclinical controls. Additional research 
has shown that even among nonclinical participants, problems about which individuals 
worry “a great deal” are significantly less concrete than problems about which they worry 
only “a little” (Stober et al., 2000). Stober and colleagues concluded that the 
concretization of worries may increase imagery and play a key role in the reduction of 
pathological worry by facilitating emotional processing (Stober, 2000; Stober et al., 2000; 
Stober & Borkovec, 2002).  
Given that worry lacks imagery and given that exposure to the entire fear 
structure is necessary to activate and modify fear (Foa & Kozak, 1986), Borkovec and Hu 
(1990) examined whether worry actually does prevent fear activation. Participants who 
were speech phobic were randomly assigned to read sentences that characterized 
worrying about giving a public speech (the worry condition), to read neutral sentences 
about common daily activities (control condition), or to read sentences about common 
ways of relaxing (relaxation condition). As expected, when participants later visualized 
themselves giving a speech, those in the worry condition experienced no cardiovascular 
response over the prospect of giving a speech, indicating that the fear structure in 
memory had not been activated. In contrast, participants in the neutral and relaxing 
conditions experienced arousal over the prospect of giving a speech, indicating that the 
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fear structure had been activated. Moreover, consistent with the idea that the reduced 
emotional arousal associated with worry comes at the expense of preventing emotional 
processing and maintaining fear, the worry group showed significantly greater self-
reported fear of the phobic imagery (images of giving a speech). Similarly, Wells and 
Papageorgiou (1995) reported that worrying about a stressor (a distressing film) led to an 
increase in intrusive thoughts about the stressor over the next three days compared to a 
relaxation control condition. Wells and Papageorgiou argued that worry had prevented 
emotional processing and thus maintained preoccupation with the stressor.  
In sum, then, the lack of imagery and the reduced concreteness of worries may 
prevent individuals from accurately identifying the problem in the actual “here and now.” 
Instead, they catastrophize about one potential problem leading to another and another. 
Thus, there is no exposure to the actual problem, as it has become a distant part of the 
chain of the individuals’ catastrophic thoughts. Lack of exposure to the actual problem 
leads to decreased arousal. This decreased arousal may be beneficial in the short-term, 
but it may prevent the fear activation and habituation in the long-term. Thus, increasing 
the concreteness of and imagery associated with worries may facilitate the activation and 
processing of individuals’ worries.  
It would follow, then, that worry could be reduced if worriers could (a) expose 
themselves to the images underlying their worries and (b) increase the concreteness of 
their worries. One means of achieving both goals may be through Pennebaker’s (1997) 
written emotional disclosure paradigm.  
Inspired by the robust finding that emotional expression usually is beneficial, 
Pennebaker proposed that writing about emotional experiences might be therapeutic. In a 
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typical written emotional disclosure study, participants are randomly assigned to write 
about either an emotional topic (e.g., traumatic experiences, adjusting to college, life 
goals, unemployment) in the experimental disclosure condition or a trivial topic (e.g., 
how they use their free time) in the control condition. Writing usually occurs for about 15 
to 30 minutes each day during anywhere from one to five days. Researchers have 
investigated a wide range of writing topics, including traumatic experiences, job loss, 
bereavement, life goals, and positive life experiences. In addition, the beneficial effects of 
disclosure do not appear to depend on writing topic (Pennebaker, 1997). 
Researchers have identified a wide range of benefits of written emotional 
disclosure in samples as diverse as children, the elderly, honors students, and maximum 
security prisoners (for a meta-analyses, see Frattaroli , 2006; Harris, 2006; Smyth, 1998). 
Although disclosure leads to brief increases in distress (Pennebaker, 1997; Smyth, 1998), 
it also leads to a wide range of long-term positive physical, psychological, and behavioral 
outcomes. Participants typically maintain these gains at post-writing assessments ranging 
anywhere from one month (e.g., Greenberg, Wortman, & Stone, 1996) to seventeen 
months (e.g., Pennebaker, Barger, & Tiebout, 1989). Note that these benefits occur for 
participants in the written emotional disclosure condition but not in the control condition, 
demonstrating that writing is effective only when the topic is personally relevant and 
emotions are expressed. 
Physical health benefits include decreased physician visits (e.g., Greenberg & 
Stone, 1992; Greenberg et al., 1996; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker & Francis, 
1996; Pennebaker, Colder, & Sharp, 1996), improvements in lung functioning among 
asthma patients and symptom reduction among rheumatoid arthritis patients (Smyth, 
 11
Stone, Hurewitz, & Kaell, 1999), and decreased self-reported physical health symptoms 
(e.g., Greenberb & Stone; Pennebaker & Beal). Written emotional disclosure has also led 
to improved immune functioning as indicated by t-helper cell growth in response to 
phytohemagglutinin (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glasser, 1988), Hepatitis B antibody 
levels (Petrie, Booth, Pennebaker, Davison, & Thomas, 1995), natural killer cell activity 
(Christensen et al., 1996), and Epstein-Barr virus antibody titers (e.g., Esterling, Antoni, 
Fletcher, Margulies, & Schneiderman, 1994). Behavioral effects of writing include 
improved grade point averages among undergraduates (e.g., Pennebaker, Colder, & 
Sharp, 1990), speedier re-employment following job loss (Spera, Buhrfeind, & 
Pennebaker, 1994), and reduced absenteeism from work (Francis & Pennebaker, 1992). 
Psychological benefits include reduced distress, negative affect, and depressive 
symptoms (e.g., Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Greenberg et al., 1996; Muray & Segal, 
1994). Note that although some inconsistent findings have emerged regarding the effects 
of written emotional disclosure (e.g., Broderick, Stone, Smyth, & Kaell, 2004; Graybeal, 
Sexton, & Pennebaker, 2002; Gidron, Peri, Connolly, & Shalev, 1996; Kloss & Lisman, 
2002), meta-analyses have found reliable positive effects (moderate in magnitude; 
Frattaroli , 2006; Harris, 2006; Smyth, 1998). 
Researchers have discussed several possible mechanisms by which written 
emotional disclosure may lead to improved psychological and physical health outcomes. 
Pennebaker’s initial studies were guided by the notion that not disclosing traumatic 
experiences was a form of inhibition, which required active effort (Pennebaker, 1988; 
Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). Pennebaker argued the stress of this prolonged effort 
contributed to health problems such as infections, ulcers, and hypertension. He further 
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argued that the more individuals attempt to inhibit thoughts and emotions, the more they 
think about these thoughts and emotions and the harder they actively work to avoid 
further thinking about them. In contrast to inhibition, expression of traumatic experiences 
should reduce stress and facilitate the integration or cognitive reorganization of the 
experiences. Thus, the benefits of written emotional disclosure may be due to terminating 
the physiological work of inhibition. 
Although inhibition theory guided the initial disclosure research, Pennebaker 
(1997) has acknowledged that recent studies have challenged the model. For instance, 
Greenberg and Stone (1992) assigned participants to write about (a) previously 
undisclosed traumas, (b) previously disclosed traumas, or (c) trivial topics. According to 
the disinhibition hypothesis, beneficial effects should be greater for writing about 
previously undisclosed than previously disclosed traumas. However, Greenberg and 
Stone found no beneficial effects in either writing condition. Greenberg et al. (1996) 
found even more compelling evidence against the disinhibition hypothesis. Specifically, 
they found that the benefits of writing about traumas individuals have experienced 
themselves were comparable to the benefits of writing about traumas that someone else 
had experienced. This study indicates that even in the absence of inhibition, writing about 
emotional material can have beneficial effects. Thus, the original disclosure/inhibition 
theory cannot fully account for the effects of written emotional disclosure.  
Pennebaker and colleagues have since proposed that narrative formation or 
cognitive processing is the key mechanism (Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). Specifically, 
writing helps individuals to organize and construct a coherent story or narrative about 
complex emotional experiences. This narrative formation helps them to achieve 
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resolution with the experiences. Such resolution enhances their perceived control over 
future emotional experiences and also leads to decreased rumination. This reasoning was 
sparked by the observation that the essays of individuals who benefited the most from 
writing appeared to be written more intelligently, thoughtfully, and emotionally. Inspired 
by this observation, Pennebaker and colleagues created a computer program called the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to analyze dozens of features of the texts of 
written essays, including the use of causal (e.g., because, reason) and insight 
(understand, realize) words. A robust finding is that individuals who benefit the most 
from disclosure are the ones whose use of insight and causal words increases from the 
first to the last writing session (for a review, see Pennebaker, 1997). According to 
Pennebaker and colleagues, this finding suggests that individuals benefit from writing 
because it helps them to form a coherent narrative and to achieve resolution with 
emotional experiences.  
A related mechanism highlighted by Sloan and colleagues is that disclosure 
facilitates exposure to aversive stimuli (Sloan & Marx, 2004; Sloan, Marx, & Epstein, 
2005). Sloan and Marx noted that the typical mood effects immediately after writing are 
consistent with an exposure model. That is, immediately after the first writing session, the 
disclosure group typically experiences an increase in negative affect relative to the 
control group, indicating fear activation. However, this negative affect is lower after 
subsequent writing sessions, indicating habituation. More direct support for the exposure 
hypothesis has now emerged as well. For example, increased physiological reactivity 
(salivary cortisol levels) to the first writing session is associated with reduced 
psychological symptoms for disclosure but not for control participants (Sloan & Marx, 
 14
2004; Sloan, Marx, & Epstein, 2005). Further, the decrease in self-reported emotional 
arousal from the first to the final writing session correlates with beneficial long-term 
functioning for disclosure but not control participants (Lumley & Provenzano, 2003; 
Sloan, Marx, & Epstein, 2005). Note, however, that the evidence does not always support 
exposure models. For example, disclosure sometimes does not lead to fear activation 
(Bernard, Jackson, & Jones, 2006). In addition, another study found that negative mood 
did not decrease from the first to the final writing session among disclosure participants 
(Kloss & Lisman, 2002; McGuire, Greenberg, & Gevirtz, 2005). However, McGuire et 
al. still found beneficial long-term effects of disclosure on blood pressure and heart rate, 
indicating that such effects can occur even in the absence of habituation. At this point, it 
is unclear whether or when exposure mediates written disclosure effects. 
Note that although findings of studies testing narrative formation and exposure 
hypotheses are generally consistent with these theories, they typically do not provide full 
tests of mediation. Specifically, in these studies there is typically no test of whether the 
independent variable (writing condition) affects the proposed mediator (causal and 
insight word use). Instead, only the path from the mediator to the dependent variable is 
examined. However, one requirement of mediation is that the independent variable cause 
the mediator (Baron & Kenny, 1986). It is thus unclear whether narrative formation and 
exposure are causes or merely correlates of improved long-term outcomes.  
Pennebaker and Beall (1986) proposed an additional potential mechanism behind 
the effects of written emotional disclosure. They suggested the effects of written 
emotional disclosure might result from increased concretization of one’s feelings and 
thoughts. This concretization may result in greater self-knowledge. Note that Pennebaker 
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and Beall did not define “concretization.” However, they appear to use the term to refer 
to clarifying and gaining insight into one’s thoughts and feelings. According to Jourard 
(1971, as cited in Pennebaker & Beal, 1986), poor mental health results when the motive 
toward self-understanding is blocked. Until individuals disclose their thoughts and 
feelings, self-understanding is blocked, resulting in poor mental health. Disclosing these 
thoughts and feelings enables individuals to concretize their thoughts and emotions, 
which in turn facilitates individuals’ search for self-understanding. This enhanced self-
understanding, in turn, leads to better mental health. Although plausible, this 
concretization account has not been subjected to empirical investigation. 
Another possibility is that reductions in anxious and depressive cognitions may 
account for the beneficial effects of written emotional disclosure. Beck and other 
cognitive therapists have maintained that cognitions play a crucial role in the 
development of worry, anxiety, and other forms of psychopathology (e.g., Beck, Emery, 
& Greenberg 1985; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). There is now strong evidence 
that cognitions do play such a role and that psychotherapy based on modifying cognitions 
can alleviate worry (e.g., Salkovskis, 1996a). Although past research has revealed that 
written emotional disclosure can lead to changes in cognitions related to the topic of 
writing (e.g., increased insight; Pennebaker, 1997), no studies have examined whether 
written emotional disclosure leads to broader changes in anxious and depressive 
cognitions or whether these broad changes, in turn, are responsible for the broad effects 
of written emotional disclosure. As with the concretization viewpoint, this account also 
has not been investigated. 
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Thus, there appear to be numerous routes by which written emotional disclosure 
may lead to enhanced functioning. Given that researchers have found beneficial effects of 
written disclosure about many different writing topics, one might wonder, why would the 
effects not extend to worry writing? Despite the breadth of writing topics studied in 
written emotional disclosure research, no research to date has examined the impact of 
writing on the experience of worry. Most previous research has examined the impact of 
writing about past problems, but worry of course concerns future problems. However, 
research on a cognitive bias known as “thought-action fusion” (TAF) raises the 
possibility that there might not be comparable beneficial effects for writing about 
potential future negative experiences. Specifically, researchers have found that 
individuals tend to believe that thinking about an anxiety-provoking future experience 
may make the experience more likely to occur (Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Shafran, 
Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). If this effect were to occur, it could inflate estimates of 
the likelihood of the problem and thus interfere with writing. It is expected, however, that 
due to exposure and narrative formation, such writing will be beneficial. Specifically, it is 
proposed that written emotional disclosure may serve to (a) increase worriers’ exposure 
to the events and situations of which they are afraid; (b) increase the extent to which their 
worries are expressed in distinct, concrete (as opposed to abstract), unequivocal, and 
situationally specific terms; and (c) help individuals to organize and gain insight into 
their future concerns. These processes should lead to a reduction in the frequency and 
intensity of worry and anxiety. 
 In addition to examining the effectiveness of writing about worries, the present 
study also sought to address a limitation of past research. Most studies have confounded 
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emotional expression with emotional valence of the writing topic. (For an exception, see 
Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). That is, conceivably one might write emotionally or neutrally 
about either an emotional or a neutral topic (producing the 2x2 design shown in Table 1). 
However, most studies have assessed the effects of writing tasks from only two of these 
four quadrants (written emotional disclosure about an emotional topic and neutral writing 
about a neutral topic). Thus, one question is whether or not individuals must access their 
deepest thoughts and feelings about a meaningful topic, or whether they could just write 
neutrally, to experience beneficial effects?  
Table 1 












This question seems particularly relevant to writing about worries because worries 
are characterized by threat overestimation. For example, worry results in part from the 
tendency to see a future threat as catastrophic, highly likely (Borkovec, 1994), and 
difficult to cope with (Salkovskis, 1996b). Perhaps encouraging participants to view a 
potential problem from an outsider’s neutral (nonemotional) perspective might reduce 
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worry. With this reasoning in mind, all four quadrants of the 2 x 2 table were included in 
the present investigation.  
An additional rationale guided the inclusion of a condition in which participants 
wrote objectively about worries. Specifically, some researchers have argued that the 
trivial topic control condition used typically in disclosure research may lack credibility or 
may not plausibly appear therapeutic (Greenhalgh, 1999; Lumley & Provenzano, 2003). 
It is possible, however, that individuals would view writing objectively about and thus 
gaining distance from worries as a more credible task. Further, in contrast to previous 
disclosure experiments, the present experiment gave participants in the objective writing 
condition several suggestions as to how to write objectively and factually. These 
instructions make this control condition more comparable to the emotional writing 
condition instructions, which typically include several suggestions on how to write 
emotionally (Pennebaker, 1994). In fact, Frattaroli’s (2006) meta-analysis found stronger 
effects of disclosure when the instructions give participants specific questions to answer 
than when such guidance is not given. Thus, a comparable control group should provide 
similar guidance.  
A final issue addressed is whether writing about the same topic or multiple topics 
during writing sessions would be most beneficial. The standard Pennebaker writing 
instructions allow participants to switch to a new topic once they feel they have finished 
their thoughts on the initial topic. As Sloan et al. (2005) note, however, this instruction 
may be inconsistent with an exposure perspective (and with a cognitive processing 
perspective, although this perspective is not the focus of their research). According to 
both exposure and cognitive processing perspectives, writing about the same topic might 
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be more beneficial. With this reasoning in mind, the present study investigated the 
potential moderating role of topic consistency, or the extent to which participants wrote 
about the same (vs. different) topics across writing sessions. 
Research Questions 
 The following questions were addressed in the present studies:  
1. What impact does writing about worries have on the frequency and intensity of 
trait worry and anxiety symptoms? 
2. What impact does writing about worries have on more general markers of well-
being such as mood and physician visits? 
3. To what extent are the benefits of writing about worries associated with any of the 
following variables: 
a. increased concretization of thoughts about potential problems; 
b. emotional processing; 
c. changes in anxious and depressive cognitions; or 
d. increased insight; 
4. Can nonemotional written disclosure produce beneficial long-term effects? 
5. Are the beneficial effects of disclosure restricted to participants who write about 
the same (as opposed to multiple) worry topic across sessions? 
Hypotheses 
Written emotional disclosure about potential problems is expected to lead to more 
adaptive problem appraisals, less trait worry, and fewer physician visits. A full model of 
the possible pathways through which writing about worries may lead to beneficial 
outcomes is shown in Figure 1. One or more of the following variables may mediate 
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these long-term effects: Narrative formation, exposure, reductions in anxious and 
depressive cognitions, and increased concretization of potential problems. In addition, 
these effects may be moderated by topic consistency such that only participants who 
write about the same worry across writing sessions benefit from disclosure.  
Support for these hypotheses would indicate that the beneficial effects of writing 
about other personally meaningful topics (e.g., traumatic experiences, life goals) do in 
fact extend to writing about worries. Further, they would suggest that writing may serve 
as a useful tool for nonclinically distressed individuals and would raise the possibility 
that writing could be useful in clinical samples.  
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Note: Outcomes include problem appraisals, trait worry, generalized anxiety 
symptoms, and physician visits. Time 1 measures of these outcomes were 
included as covariates in all outcome analyses.  
 
Overview 
 A nonclinical sample of 143 participants was administered measures of trait 
worry, GAD symptoms, and anxious and depressive cognitions to assess baseline 
functioning. They then wrote either emotionally or neutrally for 15 min about either a 
trivial topic or a future problem about which they were worried. (See Table 2 for full 













procedure was repeated on three consecutive additional days. Outcome measures 
assessing trait worry, GAD symptoms, cognitions, and problem appraisals were 
administered one month later and physician visits were assessed three months later.  
Table 2 

































 One-hundred forty-three (Age: M = 19.63 years, SD = 2.65) undergraduate men 
and women from the University of Waterloo (Ontario, Canada) participated in this study 
in exchange for either $6 Cdn for each day of participation (n = 33) or for credit in 
psychology courses (n = 110). The sample consisted of 27.5% men. The mean and SD of 
the sample’s age were 19.74 and 4.04, respectively. The sample was 59% White and 22% 
Asian. African, East Indian, Hispanic, and Middle Eastern each comprised less than 4%. 
9.5% selected “other.”  
Materials 
 Appraisal of Potential Problem Ratings. These items were developed for the 
present studies to assess the degree to which participants worried about the potential 
problem they identified, perceived likelihood and severity of the problem, perceived 
ability to cope with the problem, and perceived presence of external factors that would 
help them to cope with the problem. (See Appendix A.) These items reflect four key 
factors that determine individuals’ anxiety over perceived threat (Salkovskis, 1996b). 
These ratings will serve to gauge changes in problem appraisals as a function of writing 
condition. 
 Penn State Worry Questionnaire. The PSWQ is a well-validated measure of trait 
worry comprising 16 items responded to on a 5 point scale (1 = not at all typical of me, 5 
= very typical of me). The questionnaire has good internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability and good convergent and discriminant validity. It is also sensitive to changes in 
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trait worry as a result of psychotherapy (Meyer et al., 1990; for a review, see Molina & 
Borkovec, 1994).  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire—IV (GADQ—IV; Newman et al., 
2002). The GADQ—IV is a revision of the GADQ (Roemer, Borkovec, Posa, & 
Borkovec, 1995). The measure was developed to assess worry and physiological 
arousal—the two cardinal features of generalized anxiety disorder. The questionnaire has 
good reliability and good convergent and discriminant validity. 
Physician Visits. The director of the University’s Health Services recorded the 
number of times participants in this study had visited the Health Services for illness six 
weeks prior to and twelve weeks after writing and sent this information to the author. 
Physician visits were recorded according to Pennebaker’s (1994) guidelines. Specifically, 
an illness visit was defined as a visit for any presenting symptoms (e.g., sore throat, 
swollen eye). Visits due to injuries (e.g., having a splinter removed) and repeat visits for 
the same problem within seven days of the initial visit were excluded. Note that if the 
student visited Health Services for the same problem eight or more days after the initial 
visit, two visits would be recorded. Also, if the student visited Health Services twice in 
the same week for two separate problems, two visits would be recorded. Note that all 
participants signed a release form authorizing use of their Health Service’s data.  
Positive and Negative Affect Scales—State Version (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is a well-validated, frequently used measure of mood. The 
scale contains ten words (e.g., “enthusiastic”) assessing positive and ten words (e.g., 
“afraid”) assessing negative mood. Items are rated on a five-point scale ranging from 1 to 
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5. Instructions can be modified to assess overall mood within a specified time period. In 
the present study, participants rated their mood “right now.” 
 Cognition Checklist (CCL; Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987). The 
CCL contains 14 items (CCL-D) assessing depression-related and 12 items (CCL-A) 
assessing anxiety-related automatic cognitions. Participants respond to items on a 5 point 
scale (0 = Never, 4 = always). Both subscales have good reliability, discriminate validity, 
and convergent validity (Beck et al.; Roemer, 2001). 
 Text analyses. Participants’ written material was analyzed using the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWQ; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). The LIWC is a 
computer program that Pennebaker et al. developed by instructing groups of judges to 
evaluate the extent to which over 2,000 words or word stems related to each of dozens of 
categories. Specifically, the LIWC assesses the proportion of total words in a text that fall 
into specific categories. The analyses below tested for group differences in causal 
(because, reason) and insight words (understand, realize), emotional valence of writing 
(i.e., positive or negative), and temporal reference writing (e.g., past, present, future). The 
LIWQ has been used in past written emotional disclosure research (e.g., Pennebaker & 
Francis, 1996). 
 The concreteness of participants’ text was assessed using Coh-Metrix, a well-
validated program that assesses over 200 properties of words (Graesser, McNamara, 
Louwerse, & Cai, 2004). Coh-Metrix’s concreteness ratings are based on ratings of 
150,837 words in Coltheart’s (1981) Psycholinguistic Database. Scores for each word are 
derived from a merging of the Pavio, Colerado, and Gilhooly-Logie norms (Graesser et 
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al., 2004). Concreteness values range between 100 and 700, with higher values indicating 
higher concreteness.  
Text from all four writing days and the one month follow-up assessment were 
analyzed with both the LIWC and Coh-Metrix. Text from the one-month follow-up 
assessment were also rated independently by two individuals with regard to the degree of 
concreteness and extent of imagery evoked by each sentence based on Stober (2004, 
Personal Communication; See Appendix B). A mean concreteness and imagery rating for 
each rater was thus obtained. Because these four values were high in internal consistency 
(alpha = .802), one overall mean was calculated for each participant to represent overall 
sentence concreteness. This concreteness value also correlated significantly with the Coh-
Metrix concreteness scores (r = .39, p < .001). 
Consistency of Writing Topic. One coder evaluated the written text of participants 
from the two worry conditions to assess whether they had written about the same topic in 
each writing session or had changed topics. Note that participants who wrote about 
multiple issues (e.g., worrying about getting enough sleep to perform well on tests, 
worrying about getting good grades) that all revolved around the same theme (e.g., 
getting into graduate school) were classified as writing about one topic, because the other 
issues were a component of the topic. The same rater evaluated whether participants in 
the two object writing conditions had written about the same object in all four writing 
sessions.  
 Topic Identification and Writing Instructions. All participants identified and 
briefly described the most significant problem worrying them and the most important 
object in their room (as described in Appendix C).  Participants were instructed to write 
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emotionally or objectively about either the object in their room or the problem worrying 
them (as described in Appendix D). Researchers have used similar control writing topics 
(Pennebaker, 1997), although they have not fully crossed emotion expression with 
emotion valence in a 2 x 2 design. The emotional writing instructions encouraged 
participants to “really let go and explore your deepest emotions and thoughts.” To make 
the emotional writing/object condition as comparable as possible to the emotional 
writing/worry condition with respect to emotional expression, the former group received 
the same encouragement “really let go and explore your deepest emotions and thoughts.” 
In contrast, objective writing instructions encouraged participants to be as objective and 
factual as possible. Several questions to guide participants’ writing were also included 
and appear in Appendix D.  
Procedure 
 Undergraduates were invited to participate in a study involving “writing about life 
events.” They were informed that participating in the study would involve writing about a 
topic (possibly future problems they were worried about) on four consecutive days and 
would involve coming to the laboratory on one additional occasion one month later. The 
experimenter emphasized that it was essential that participants come to the laboratory on 
all five occasions and that they should not agree to participate if they did not believe they 
could fulfill this requirement. Such a procedure has worked successfully at this university 
(Ferguson, 1993) and in over one-hundred studies elsewhere (Frattaroli, 2006).  
 On the first day, participants completed the PSWQ, the GADQ—IV, and the CCL. 
These scores served as the pre-experimental (time 1) assessment to ensure equivalency 
across experimental groups and were also used as covariates in the analyses of long-term 
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outcomes, as in previous studies. Next, all participants identified the most significant 
potential problem about which they were worried. Participants were then randomly 
assigned to write for fifteen minutes about either a trivial topic or the future problem. 
After this writing task, participants completed the PANAS, marking the end of 
participation for the first day. On days 2, 3, and 4 of participation, the procedure was the 
same except that the individual difference measures (i.e., the PSWQ, GADQ—IV, CCL), 
were not administered. After the fourth writing session participants received a “partial 
debriefing” summarizing the tasks the participant had completed and explaining why a 
full debriefing could not be provided until all long-term data had been collected.   
One month after the final writing session, participants came back to the laboratory 
to complete the PSWQ, GADQ—IV, CCL, and Appraisal of Potential Problem items. 
Participants were shown their brief description on day 1 of the potential problem 
worrying them as a reminder. Next, they typed a description of their potential problem for 
five minutes. The text of this writing was analyzed to assess whether writing condition 
impacted how participants subsequently described their potential problems. (See 
Appendix E for specific instructions.) After completing this writing task, all participants 
were thanked for their time. They also received a second “partial debriefing.” Finally, 
three months after writing (when all physician visit data were collected), participants 
were fully debriefed via electronic mail. 
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Results 
Content of Individuals’ Worries and Objects. Participants’ worries were classified 
based on content into the ten domains comprising the Student Worry Scale (Davey et al., 
1992). An eleventh category labeled “other” was used for worries that did not fall into the 
ten domains or overlapped multiple domains with no clear focus on one domain. The 
most common worry topic was academic demands (37.8%) followed by personal 
relationships (20.3%), job prospects (18.2), health (11.2%), other (7.0%), what people 
think of me (2.1%), financial concerns (2.1%), accommodation (0.7%), and world affairs 
(0.7%). The objects participants wrote about were classified as follows: sentimental 
items/gifts (40.0%); photographs of family, friends, or romantic partners (11.7%); 
computers (11.7%), religious symbols (10.0%); musical instruments (5.0%); art work 
(3.3%); and other (20.0%; e.g., “an Ikea table”).  
Approach to analyses of direct effects. The first set of main analyses tested 
whether long-term psychological and physical health effects differed by experimental 
condition. The effects of writing were examined using dummy coding in multiple 
regression as instructed by Hardy (1993). Specifically, the time 1 measure of the variable 
being predicted at time 2 was entered as a covariate in step 1 of all analyses. Dummy 
coded variables reflecting each experimental condition were entered in step 2.1 A 
significant change in R2 from step 1 would indicate that experimental condition 
influenced time 2 scores independent of time 1 scores. That is, this finding would indicate 
that the means of at least two experimental conditions differed significantly from each 
other on the dependent variable. The nature of this effect would be ascertained by 
comparing the regression coefficients for the dummy vector representing each condition. 
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 Approach to mediational analyses. The second set examined potential mediators 
and moderators of the long-term effects of writing. Although many approaches to testing 
for mediation exist, MacKinnon and colleagues found in a large simulation study that the 
best balance between type I and II errors was achieved in a two-step approach that 
examines the joint significance of the two paths comprising the mediated effect 
(Mackinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). First, the independent variable 
must influence the hypothesized mediator. In the present research, this effect would be 
indicated by differences in means between writing groups on the hypothesized mediator. 
Second, the hypothesized mediator must influence the dependent variable. This effect 
would be indicated by a significant multiple regression coefficient for the path from the 
hypothesized mediator to the dependent variable. In addition, the present analyses 
explored whether any hypothesized mediators affected outcomes only for certain writing 
conditions (i.e., moderated mediation). For example, emotional processing may be linked 
to outcomes only for written emotional disclosure participants.  
Because the hypothesized mediators were comprised of changes over time, tests 
of mediation were complex. That is, emotional disclosure was expected to lead to 
increases in insight and causal word use and concreteness and decreases in immediate 
post-writing negative affect from days 1 to 4. These changes were expected to lead to 
reduced long-term trait worry and physician visits and more adaptive problem appraisals. 
Because the mediator was measured at multiple time points, repeated measures ANOVAs 
were used to examine the impact of the independent variable (writing condition) on the 
hypothesized mediator. The effect of the hypothesized mediator on outcomes was 
examined in multiple regression. Specifically, in the first two steps, covariates and 
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condition dummy vectors were entered as in the main effect analyses described above. In 
the next step, scores on the hypothesized mediator on days 1 and 4 were entered. If the 
effect of day 4 were significant, it would support the second component of mediation: 
changes in the mediator (from day 1 to day 4) impacted outcomes. In other words, day 4 
scores after removing variance in day 1 scores affected outcomes. Finally, the interaction 
between day 4 scores and condition was explored in the next step to assess whether 
changes in the proposed mediator affected outcomes differently as a function of 
experimental condition. 
Diagnostics. Standardized scores were created for all variables analyzed. Data 
points were excluded from analyses if they deviated from the mean by three or more 
standard deviations and were discontinuous from the rest of the distribution. One 
individual’s data were excluded because her age was 9.2 standard deviations above the 
mean. Cases were also excluded from multiple regression analyses if the absolute value 
of their standardized DFBETAS was greater than 1, indicating undo influence (as 
recommended by Neter, Wasserman, and Kitner 1989, cited in Pedhazur, 1997). In the 
ANOVAs below, Cook’s distance values and standardized residuals were examined. 
Analyses were performed both including and excluding cases with scores that were 
discontinuous from the rest of the sample. It is noted in the text whether or not excluding 
the cases of influence meaningfully changed the results. Any change in which a 
nonsignificant effect (p > .05) becomes statistically significant (p < .05) or a significant 
effect becomes nonsignificant is considered a “meaningful change,” whereas any change 
in statistical significance that does involve a change from above to below or below to 
above the .05 alpha level is considered not meaningful for present purposes. 
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Note that three participants’ data were excluded from all analyses because they 
were accidentally given the experimental instructions for the wrong group on one of the 
four writing days. Nineteen more participants were excluded because they were 
unavailable for the one-month follow-up. The completion rate (86.8%) is comparable to 
that of most expressive writing studies. Note that drop-outs did not differ from 
completers on any time 1 variables (ps > .21). The use of a completion rather than an 
intention-to-treat analysis is the standard decision in written emotional disclosure 
research (Meads, Lyons, & Carroll, 2003). 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Means and standard deviations for all main variables appear for the full sample 
and by condition in Table 3. Correlations between these variables appear in Table 4. The 
means, standard deviations, and correlations are all generally within the expected range. 
Table 3  
Means by Condition and for Full Sample 
Variable EW/W OW/W EW/O OW/O Full 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Phys. Vis_T1 0.37 1.00 0.24 0.58 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.31 0.22 0.62 
Phys. Vis_T2 0.40 1.33 0.38 1.18 0.35 1.05 0.28 0.59 0.36 1.06 
Prob. 
Appraise. 
5.24 1.84 5.16 1.40 5.22 1.83 5.60 1.61 5.30 1.66 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Means by Condition and for Full Sample 
Variable EW/W OW/W EW/O OW/O Full 
PANAS_NA_
D1 
2.13 0.84 1.70 0.48 1.56 0.42 1.41 0.40 1.71 0.62 
PANAS_NA_
D4 
1.83 0.72 1.42 0.38 1.47 0.53 1.31 0.40 1.51 0.55 
Worry_T1 0.02 0.94 -0.05 1.07 -0.09 1.07 0.19 0.90 0.00 1.00 
Worry_T2 0.09 0.97 -0.07 0.97 -0.14 1.10 0.19 0.94 0.00 1.00 
CCL_A_T1 1.08 0.82 0.63 0.49 0.83 0.60 0.87 0.71 0.85 0.67 
CCL_A_T2 0.98 0.82 0.71 0.64 0.78 0.55 0.97 0.79 0.83 0.69 
Note: EW/W = Emotional Writing about Worries; OW/W = Objective Writing about 
Worries; EW/O = Emotional Writing about Objects; OW/O = Objective Writing about 
Objects; T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2; Phys. Vis = Physician Visits; Prob. Appraise. = 
Problem Appraisals; PANAS_NA_D1 and PANAS_NA_D4 = Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule—Negative Affect scores on days 1 and 4, respectively; Worry = Worry 
Factor Scores; CCL_A = Cognition Checklist—Anxiety. 
 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Means by Condition and for Full Sample 
Variable EW/W OW/W EW/O OW/O Full 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
CCL_D_T1 1.07 0.81 0.78 0.52 0.93 0.73 1.10 0.87 0.96 0.75 
CCL_D_T2 1.06 0.90 0.82 0.63 0.87 0.76 1.17 0.85 0.97 0.79 
Note: EW/W = Emotional Writing about Worries; OW/W = Objective Writing about 
Worries; EW/O = Emotional Writing about Objects; OW/O = Objective Writing about 


























Vis_T1 1 .63** .01 .05 .13 .14 .07
Phys. 
Vis_T2 .63** 1 .13 .16 .23* .28** .14
PSWQ_T1 .01 .13 1 .89** .78** .74** .50**
PSWQ_T2 .05 .16 .89** 1 .78** .84** .47**
GADQ--
IV_T1 .13 .23* .78** .78** 1 .85** .59**
GADQ--
IV_T2 .14 .28** .74** .84** .85** 1 .54**
CCL—
A_T1 .07 .14 .50** .47** .59** .54** 1
CCL—
A_T2 .12 .25** .46** .56** .59** .66** .78**
CCL—
D_T1 .03 .12 .55** .56** .57** .53** .63**
CCL—
D_T2 .09 .20* .51** .59** .57** .58** .56**
PANAS—
NA_ D1 -.09 -.09 .27** .21* .32** .26** .22*
PANAS—
NA_ D4 -.08 -.03 .16 .17 .25** .20* .25**
Worry_T1 .10 .24** .75** .85** .81** .87** .67**
Worry_T2 .06 .18 .84** .80** .87** .79** .76**
Prob. 
Appraise. -.02 .08 .51** .54** .54** .53** .43**
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2; Phys. Vis. = Physician Visits; PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; GADQ—IV = Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire—IV; 
CCL—A = Cognition Checklist—Anxiety; CCL—D = Cognition Checklist—
Depression; PANAS—NA = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—Negative Affect 
(D1 and D4 = Days 1 and Days 4, respectively); Worry = factor analytically derived 
scores based on analyses at each time period of the PSWQ and GADQ; Prob. Appraise. = 
Problem Appraisals. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 





















Phys. Vis_T1 .12 .023 .09 -.09 -.08 .10 .06
Phys. Vis_T2 .25** .12 .20* -.09 -.03 .24** .18
PSWQ_T1 .46** .55** .51** .27** .16 .75** .84**
PSWQ_T2 .56** .56** .59** .21* .17 .85** .80**
GADQ--IV_T1 .59** .57** .57** .32** .25** .81** .87**
GADQ--IV_T2 .66** .53** .58** .26** .20* .87** .79**
CCL—A_T1 .78** .63** .56** .22* .25** .67** .76**
CCL—A_T2 1 .63** .69** .15 .20* .82** .72**
CCL—D_T1 .63** 1 .90** .21* .24** .77** .82**
CCL—D_T2 .69** .90** 1 .15 .21* .83** .76**
PANAS—NA_ 
D1 .15 .21* .15 1 .60** .23* .31**
PANAS—NA_ 
D4 .20* .24** .21* .60** 1 .24** .28**
Worry_T1 .819** .769** .834** .225* .237** 1 .906**
Worry_T2 .72** .82** .76** .31** .28** .91** 1
Prob. Apprais. .51** .59** .63** .21* .23* .33** .56**
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2; Phys. Vis. = Physician Visits; PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; GADQ—IV = Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire—IV; 
CCL—A = Cognition Checklist—Anxiety; CCL—D = Cognition Checklist—
Depression; PANAS—NA = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—Negative Affect 
(D1 and D4 = Days 1 and Days 4, respectively); Worry = factor analytically derived 
scores based on analyses at each time period of the PSWQ and GADQ; Prob. Appraise. = 
Problem Appraisals.  
 
Manipulation Checks 
 Total negative and total positive emotion expression variables were created by 
summing the proportion of negative and positive emotion words (as identified by the 
LIWC) expressed on each day for each participant. A similar approach was used to create 
a variable reflecting future time-orientation of participants’ written text. Univariate 
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ANOVAs revealed significant between-group differences on all three above variables, 
(ps < .001). All effects were explored with Tukey post-hoc analyses and are reported 
below. See Table 5 for all group means. 
Table 5 
Word Usage by Group 
 EW/W OW/W EW/O OW/O 
Past 3.22 (1.73) 2.61 (1.81) 3.61 (1.31) 3.36 (1.17) 
Present 10.97 (2.23) 10.97 (2.50) 10.53 (1.83) 9.43 (1.81) 
Future 1.56 (0.62) 2.35 (0.91) 1.14 (0.43) 0.94 (0.50) 
Negative Emotion 2.89 (0.89) 2.24 (0.94) 1.45 (0.54) 0.95 (0.41) 
Positive Emotion 2.34 (0.65) 2.24 (0.85) 2.94 (0.74) 1.89 (0.66) 
Causal 1.38 (0.47) 1.36 (0.60) 1.14 (0.46) 1.19 (0.54) 
Insight 2.57 (0.76) 2.58 (0.75) 2.35 (0.68) 1.10 (0.42) 
Note: EW = Emotional Writing/Worry; OW/W = Objective Writing/Worry; EW/O = 
Emotional Writing/Object; OW/O = Objective Writing/Object. Numerical values 
represent the group mean proportion of total words that fall into the relevant category. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
 There was a main effect of condition on use of future-time orientation words in 
text, F (3, 116) = 26.84, p < .001. As expected, both worry conditions expressed 
significantly greater future orientation than did the objective object condition (ps < .01). 
The two worry groups also expressed more future orientation than the emotional object 
condition, although the difference between the emotional worry and emotional object 
condition was only marginally significant (p < .06). The only additional difference was 
significantly higher future orientation in the emotional worry than in the objective worry 
 37
condition (p < .001). Thus, findings generally supported the prediction that worry writing 
would lead to greater future orientation than would control writing. 
 There was also a main effect of condition on use of negative emotion words, F (3, 
116) = 32.79, p < .001. As hypothesized, the emotional writing/worry group used 
significantly more negative emotion words than the other three conditions (all ps < .01). 
Contrary to expectations, however, the emotional writing/object group used fewer 
negative emotion words than did the objective writing/worry group (p < .01). The 
emotional writing/object group used more negative emotion words than did the objective 
writing/object group (p < .04). In addition, the objective writing/worry group used 
significantly more negative emotion words than did the emotional writing/object and 
objective writing/object conditions (ps < .001). No other significant between-group 
differences emerged. Note that the results did not change meaningfully when one point 
with a high Cook’s distance value was eliminated. Thus, as instructed, participants in the 
emotional writing/worry and emotional writing/object groups did indeed express more 
negative emotion (although the latter group did not express more negative emotion than 
the objective writing/worry group).  
Predicting Physician Visits 
 Independent of baseline physician visits, experimental condition was expected to 
influence visits such that at Time 2 the emotional disclosure group would have the fewest 
visits. Thus, in step 1, time 1 physician visits were entered as a covariate. In step 2, three 
dummy coded vectors were entered to represent the four experimental conditions.  
 In step 1, time 1 physician visits significantly predicted time 2 visits (β = .63, p < 
.001). Contrary to expectations, the change in R2 from steps 1 to 2 was nonsignificant (p 
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= .89), indicating that experimental condition did not influence physician visits. Note that 
the statistical significance of no predictors changed meaningfully when the analysis was 
repeated without one case that exerted extreme influence. (See Table 6 for regression 
statistics.) 
Table 6 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Physician 
Visits 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 physician visits 
Step 2 
Time 1 physician visits 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 






















Note. R2 = .40 for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .90) 
**p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Obtaining Worry Scores via Data Reduction 
 Two self-report indicators of worry (the PSWQ and GADQ—IV) were measured 
at times 1 and 2. All items from these two measures were entered in a factor analysis 
from the time 1 assessment and a separate factor analysis from the time 2 assessment. 
Based on the eigenvalue greater than 1 rule and examination of the scree plot, principle 
component analyses indicated a one-factor solution best accounted for the data at each 
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time point. This one factor, labeled “worry,” accounted for 69.2 and 73.3% of the 
variance at times 1 and 2, respectively. Regression-based factor scores were used in 
subsequent analyses.  
Predicting Worry 
 Independent of baseline worry, experimental condition was expected to influence 
Time 2 worry such that the emotional disclosure/worry group would have the fewest 
visits. The approach to data analysis mirrored that for predicting physician visits. Thus, in 
step 1, time 1 worry was entered as a covariate. In step 2, three dummy coded vectors 
were entered to represent the four experimental conditions. In step 1, the only significant 
predictor of Time 2 worry was Time 1 worry (β = .61, p < .001). Contrary to 
expectations, the change in R2 from step 1 to step 2 was nonsignificant (p = .86), 
indicating that experimental condition did not influence worry scores. (See Table 7 for 
regression statistics.) 
Table 7 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Worry 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 Worry 
Step 2 
Time 1 Worry 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
























Note. R2 = .37 for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .86) 
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Predicting Appraisal of Potential Problems 
The emotional writing/worry condition was expected to have the least 
pathological problem appraisals. An analysis with three dummy coded vectors 
representing the four experimental conditions entered in a regression equation as 
predictors appraisals was nonsignificant (p = .75). Thus, problem appraisals were 




Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Problem 
Appraisals 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 














Note. R2 = .10 for step 1 
*p < .05 
Negative Affect Mediation 
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The first potential mediator examined was negative affect. Recall that a decrease 
in immediate post-writing negative affect from days 1 to 4 was expected to predict 
beneficial outcomes (fewer physician visits, less worry, more adaptive problem 
appraisals) at time 2, but only for the emotional disclosure/worry group. Thus, the first 
analysis examined whether condition affected the change in negative affect from days 1 
to 4. Thus, a 2 x 4 (time 1: day 1 vs 4 x experimental condition) repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted with time as the within- and experimental condition as the 
between-participants factors. A significant main effect of condition with Tukey post-hoc 
analyses indicated that, as expected, the mean for PANAS—NA scores was significantly 
higher for the emotional writing/worry group than for the other three groups, indicating 
fear activation, F (3, 116) = 7.48, p < .01. (See Table 9 for ANOVA statistics.) No other 
between-group effects were statistically significant. A main effect of time indicated that 
negative mood dropped slightly from days 1 (M = 1.71, SD = .61) to 4 (M = 1.51, SD = 
.55), F (3, 116) = 18.34, p < .01. Contrary to expectation, however, there was no 
significant interaction between time and experimental condition (p = .20), indicating that 
the change in negative mood from days 1 to 4 did not differ depending on experimental 
condition. Note that removing one case with a high Cook’s distance value did not alter 
the results meaningfully. The nonsignificant interaction indicates that condition did not 
impact the hypothesized mediator (drop in negative affect from days 1 to 4). 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance for Negative Affect 
































Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
  Although condition did not affect changes in negative affect, it is still possible 
that such changes affected outcomes. As a test of this possibility, the same variables were 
entered in steps 1 and 2 to predict physician visits as in the main effect analyses reported 
above. The results of these two steps are not repeated here. In step 3, post-writing 
negative affect scores for days 1 and 4 were entered. A significant change in R2, and more 
specifically, a significant effect of day 4, would indicate that changes in negative affect 
predicted visits. However, no such effect emerged (p = .83). In step 4, cross-products 
between each dummy coded vector and day 4 negative affect were entered. A significant 
change in R2 would indicate that changes in negative affect between days 1 and 4 related 
to time 2 physician visits differently as a function of experimental condition. This step 
also did not reach significance (p = .21). See Table 10 for all regression statistics. 
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Table 10 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Physician 
Visits with Condition, Negative Affect, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 physician visits 
Step 2 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
Step 3 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 





























































EW/W dummy variable*PANAS_NA_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*PANAS_NA_D4 

















Note. R2 = .40 for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .90); ∆R2 = .00 for Step 3 (p = .83); 
∆R2 = .02 for Step for Step 4 (p = .21). 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; PANAS_NA_D1 and PANAS_NA_D4 
 = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—negative affect scores on days 1 and 4, 
respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
  
 Similar analyses were performed separately to predict worry and problem 
appraisals. (See Tables 11 and 12 for regression statistics.) That is, baseline scores were 
entered in step 1 (only for worry; no baseline data for appraisals were collected). Next, 
the condition vectors were entered. To test mediation, days 1 and 4 negative affect were 
entered in the next step. The change in R2 was not significant for the worry (p = .32), 
although it was for problem appraisals (p < .01). In the latter analysis, days 1 and 4 each 
did not uniquely affect problem appraisals (βs = .17 and .18 for days 1 and 4, ps > .12). 
Thus, day 4 negative affect did not predict appraisals for any outcome variable when 
holding day 1 negative affect constant, indicating that the drop from day 1 to day 4 did 
not affect outcomes. In the next step, interaction terms between the dummy coded vectors 
and day 4 negative affect were entered. The change in R2 for this step was not significant 
for the prediction of worry (p = .35) or problem appraisals (p = .15). Note that the results 
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did not change meaningfully when a case with a high SDFBETA was removed from the 
problem appraisal analysis. In sum, the results indicate that experimental condition did 
not impact change in negative affect from days 1 to 4 and this change did not affect 
outcomes. Thus, contrary to hypotheses, negative affect served no mediating role. 
Table 11 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Problem 
Appraisals with Condition, Negative Affect, and Their Interaction  
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 2 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 

















































EW/W dummy variable*PANAS_NA_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*PANAS_NA_D4 















Note. R2 = .01 (p = .75) for step 1; ∆R2 = .08 for Step 2 (p < .01); ∆R2 = .04 for Step 3 (p 
= .15) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; PANAS_NA_D1 and PANAS_NA_D4 
 = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—negative affect scores on days 1 and 4, 
respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Table 12 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Worry, 
Negative Affect, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 Worry 
Step 2 
Time 1 Worry 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 3 





























EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




Time 1 worry 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
PANAS_NA_D1 
PANAS_NA_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*PANAS_NA_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*PANAS_NA_D4 
















































Note. R2 = .41 (p < .01) for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .86); ∆R2 = .01 for Step 3 (p 
= .32); ∆R2 = .02 for Step 4 (p = .35) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; PANAS_NA_D1 and PANAS_NA_D4 
 = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—negative affect scores on days 1 and 4, 
respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Causal Word Use Mediation 
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 The next analyses examined the hypothesis that (a) use of causal words should 
increase from days 1 to 4 but only for emotional-worry participants and (b) this increase 
should relate to improved outcomes. As with negative affect, a 2 x 4 (time: day 1 vs. 4 x 
experimental condition) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with time as the 
within- and experimental condition as the between-participants factors. No effects of time 
or condition, and crucially, no time by condition interaction emerged, Fs < 1, ps > .22. 
Removing one case with a high Cook’s distance value did not meaningfully impact the 
results. Thus, condition did not affect either total causal word use or the change in causal 
word use from days 1 to 4. See Table 13 for all ANOVA statistics.  
Table 13 
Analysis of Variance for Causal Words 
































Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
 The next analyses examined whether changes in causal word had an impact on 
outcomes. Thus, in separate series of regression analyses predicting each of the three 
main outcome variables, the time 1 measure of that variable was entered in the first step 
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and the three condition vectors were entered in the second step. See Tables 14 through 16 
for all regression statistics. In the third step, day 1 and day 4 causal word use were 
entered. The change in R2 was nonsignificant for the prediction of physician visits (p = 
.15), worry (p = .50), and problem appraisals (p = .16). Thus, causal word use did not 
impact any outcome variables. The change in R2 in the next step (containing interaction 
terms) was also nonsignificant when predicting physician visits (p = .42), worry (p = .67), 
and problem appraisals (p = .32). Note that this step was marginally significant (p = .07) 
for the prediction of physician visits but lost significance when three points of influence 
were removed. Thus, contrary to hypotheses, the results revealed no effect of condition 
on causal word use and no effect of such use on outcomes.  
Table 14 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Physician 
Visits with Condition, Causal Word Use, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B Β 
Step 1 
Time 1 physician visits 
Step 2 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
Step 3 





























EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
CAUSAL_D1 
CAUSAL_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*CAUSAL_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*CAUSAL_D4 
















































Note. R2 = .40 for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .90); ∆R2 = .02 for Step 3 (p = .15); 
∆R2 = .04 for Step for Step 4 (p = .07). 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; CAUSAL_D1 and CAUSAL_D4 
 =  Causal word use on days 1 and 4, respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Table 15 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Problem 
Appraisals with Condition, Negative Affect, and Their Interaction 
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Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 2 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
CAUSAL_D1 
CAUSAL_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*CAUSAL_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*CAUSAL_D4 



























































Note. R2 = .02 (p = .63) for step 1; ∆R2 = .03 for Step 2 (p = .16); ∆R2 = .03 for Step 3 (p 
= .32) 
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EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; CAUSAL_D1 and CAUSAL_D4 
 = Causal word use on days 1 and 4, respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Table 16 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Worry, 
Causal Word Use, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 Worry 
Step 2 
Time 1 Worry 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 3 
Time 1 worry 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 






















































EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
CAUSAL_D1 
CAUSAL_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*CAUSAL_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*CAUSAL_D4 



























Note. R2 = .41 (p < .01) for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .86); ∆R2 = .01 for Step 3 (p 
= .50); ∆R2 = .01 for Step 4 (p = .67) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; CAUSAL_D1 and CAUSAL_D4 
 = Causal word use on days 1 and 4, respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Insight Word Use Mediation 
The following analyses assessed the hypothesis that (a) use of insight words 
should increase from days 1 to 4 but only for emotional writing/worry participants and 
(b) this increase should relate to improved outcomes. As with negative affect, a 2 x 4 
(time: day 1 vs. 4 x experimental condition) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
with time as the within- and experimental condition as the between-participants factors. 
See Table 17 for ANOVA statistics. There were significant effects of both time, F (3, 
116) = 4.8, p < .001, and condition, F (3, 116) = 1186.14, p < .001. The time effect 
indicated that insight increased slightly from day 1 (M = 2.11, SD = 1.06) to day 4 (M = 
2.39, SD = 1.18). Tukey post-hoc analyses indicated that the condition effect was driven 
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by the use of significantly fewer insight words in the objective writing/object condition 
than the other three conditions (all ps < .001). No other between-group differences 
emerged. Further, there was no significant interaction (p = .93), indicating that condition 
did not affect the change in insight word use. Thus, the data did not support the first 
component of the mediational hypothesis (that condition would affect the change in 
insight word use). 
Table 17 
 
Analysis of Variance for Insight Words 
































Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
The next analyses examined whether changes in insight word use affected 
outcomes. Thus, in separate series of regression analyses predicting each of the three 
main outcome variables, the time 1 measure of that variable was entered in the first step 
and the three condition vectors were entered in the second step. (See Tables 18 to 20 for 
all regression statistics.) On the third step, day 1 and day 4 insight word use were entered. 
The change in R2 was nonsignificant for predicting physician visits (p = .63), worry (p = 
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.26), and problem appraisals (p = .53). Thus, insight word use did not impact any 
outcomes. Removal of two points of influence in the physician visits analysis did not 
meaningfully impact the statistical significance of the change in R2 values. The 
interaction between condition and insight was also nonsignificant for physician visits (p = 
.83), worry (p = .79), and problem appraisals (p = .43). Thus, contrary to hypotheses, the 
results revealed no effect of condition on changes in insight word use and no effect of 
such word use on outcomes. 
Table 18 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Physician 
Visits with Condition, Insight Word Use, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B Β 
Step 1 
Time 1 physician visits 
Step 2 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
Step 3 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 









































Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
INSIGHT_D1 
INSIGHT_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*INSIGHT_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*INSIGHT_D4 






































Note. R2 = 0.40 for step 1; ∆R2 = 0.00 for Step 2 (p = 0.90); ∆R2 = 0.01 for Step 3 (p = 
0.63); ∆R2 = 0.01 for Step for Step 4 (p = 0.83). 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; INSIGHT_D1 and INSIGHT_D4 
 =  INSIGHT word use on days 1 and 4, respectively0.  
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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Table 19 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Problem 
Appraisals with Condition, Insight Word Use, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 2 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
INSIGHT_D1 
INSIGHT_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*INSIGHT_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*INSIGHT_D4 




























































Note. R2 = .02 (p = .63) for step 1; ∆R2 = .01 for Step 2 (p = .53); ∆R2 = .02 for Step 3 (p 
= .43) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; INSIGHT_D1 and INSIGHT_D4 
 = Insight word use on days 1 and 4, respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Table 20 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Worry, 
Insight Word Use, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 Worry 
Step 2 
Time 1 Worry 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 3 
Time 1 worry 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 















































Time 1 worry 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
INSIGHT_D1 
INSIGHT_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*INSIGHT_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*INSIGHT_D4 
































Note. R2 = .41 (p < .01) for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .86); ∆R2 = .02 for Step 3 (p 
= .26); ∆R2 = .01 for Step 4 (p = .79) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; INSIGHT_D1 and INSIGHT_D4 
 = INSIGHT word use on days 1 and 4, respectively.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Concreteness Mediation 
 The analyses below tested the hypothesis that the concreteness of participants’ 
writing, as assessed by Coh-Metrix, should increase from days 1 to 4 but only for 
emotional-worry participants and (b) this increase should relate to improved outcomes. 
Again, a 2 x 4 (time: day 1 vs. 4 x experimental condition) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted with time as the within- and experimental condition as the between-
participants factors. (See Table 21 for ANOVA statistics.) There were significant effects 
of both time, F (3, 116) = 4.97, p < .01, and condition, F (3, 116) = 63,854.03, p < .001. 
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The time effect indicated that concreteness decreased slightly from day 1 (M = 351.17, 
SD = 24.84) to day 4 (M = 346.59, SD = 26.63). Tukey post-hoc analyses indicated that 
the effect of condition was driven by the use of significantly more concrete words in the 
objective writing/object condition than the other three conditions (all ps < .001). 
Participants in the emotional writing/object condition also used significantly more 
concrete words than did those in either worry condition (ps < .02). Contrary to 
expectation, the interaction between condition and time was nonsignificant (p = .70), 
indicating that the change in concreteness over time did not vary by condition.  
Table 21 
Analysis of Variance for Concreteness 
































Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
The next analyses examined whether changes (from day 1 to day 4) in 
concreteness influenced outcomes. Thus, in separate series of regression analyses 
predicting each of the three main outcome variables, the time 1 measure of that variable 
was entered in the first step and the three condition vectors were entered in the second 
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step. (See Tables 22-24 for regression statistics.) On the third step, day 1 and day 4 
concreteness scores were entered. The change in R2 was nonsignificant for predicting 
physician visits (p = .93), worry (p = .91), and problem appraisals (p = .81). Thus, insight 
word use did not impact any outcomes. The interaction between condition and insight 
was also nonsignificant for physician visits (p = .90), worry (p = .65), and problem 
appraisals (p = .44). Thus, change concreteness did not relate to outcomes differentially 
as a function of condition. Contrary to hypotheses, the results revealed no effect of 
condition on changes in concreteness and no effect of this change on outcomes. 
Table 22 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Physician 
Visits with Condition, Concreteness, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B Β 
Step 1 
Time 1 physician visits 
Step 2 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
Step 3 
Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 







































Time 1 physician visits 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
CONCRETE_D1 
CONCRETE_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*CONCRETE_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*CONCRETE_D4 












































Note. R2 = 0.40 for step 1; ∆R2 = 0.00 for Step 2 (p = 0.90); ∆R2 = 0.01 for Step 3 (p = 
0.93); ∆R2 = 0.00 for Step for Step 4 (p = 0.90). 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; CONCRETE_D1 and CONCRETE_D4 
 =  INSIGHT word use on days 1 and 4, respectively. Some Β coefficients are greater 
than the absolute value of 1 because several predictors are uncorrelated with the criterion 
but are correlated with each other.  
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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Table 23 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Problem 
Appraisals with Condition, Concreteness, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 2 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 




EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
CONCRETE_D1 
CONCRETE_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*CONCRETE_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*CONCRETE_D4 




























































Note. R2 = .02 (p = .63) for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .81); ∆R2 = .02 for Step 3 (p 
= .44) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; CONCRETE_D1 and CONCRETE_D4 
 = Insight word use on days 1 and 4, respectively. Some Β coefficients are greater than 
the absolute value of 1 because several predictors are uncorrelated with the criterion but 
are correlated with each other.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Table 24 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 Worry, 
Concreteness, and Their Interaction 
Variable B SE B β 
Step 1 
Time 1 Worry 
Step 2 
Time 1 Worry 
Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable 
Step 3 
Time 1 worry 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 









































Time 1 worry 
EW/W dummy variable 
OW/W dummy variable 
EW/O dummy variable 
CONCRETE_D1 
CONCRETE_D4 
EW/W dummy variable*CONCRETE_D4 
OW/W dummy variable*CONCRETE_D4 






































Note. R2 = .41 (p < .01) for step 1; ∆R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .86); ∆R2 = .00 for Step 3 (p 
= .91); ∆R2 = .01 for Step 4 (p = .65) 
EW/W dummy variable = Emotion Writing/Worry dummy variable; OW/W dummy 
variable = Objective Writing/Worry dummy variable; and EW/O dummy variable = 
Emotional Writing/Object dummy variable; CONCRETE_D1 and CONCRETE_D4 
 = CONCRETE word use on days 1 and 4, respectively. Some Β coefficients are greater 
than the absolute value of 1 because several predictors are uncorrelated with the criterion 
but are correlated with each other.  
**p < .01, *p < .05 
Cognitive Mediation 
 The following analyses tested (a) whether experimental condition produced 
changes in time 2 anxious and depressive cognitions (independent of time 1 scores) as 
measured by the CCL-A and CCL-D and (b) whether these changes were related to 
outcomes. Because the two subscales were highly correlated at times 1 and 2 (rs = .52 
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and .69, ps < .01), a multivariate general linear model was conducted. Specifically, 
condition and time 1 scores were entered as predictors of time 2 anxious and depressive 
cognitions. Time 1 CCL-A and CCL-D were each significant predictors of time 2 scores 
(ps < .001). Time 1 CCL-A was a significant multivariate predictor, F (3, 116) = 50.96, p 
< .001, eta2 = .47. Similarly, Time 1 CCL-D was a significant multivariate predictor F (3, 
116) = 168.51, p < .001, eta2 = .75. Condition did not, however, influence time 2 scores 
(p = .83), eta2 = .01.  
 The subsequent analyses examined whether changes in CCL-A and –D scores 
impacted outcomes. Thus, in separate series of regression analyses predicting each of the 
three main outcome variables, the time 1 measure of that variable was entered in the first 
step and the three condition vectors were entered in the second step. In step 3, time 1 and 
time 2 CCL-D scores were entered. (CCL-A scores are examined later.) The change in R2 
was nonsignificant when predicting physician visits (∆R2 = .02, p = .11), although it was 
significant when predicting worry and problem appraisals (∆R2 =.16 and .39, ps < .001). 
For the latter two variables, time 2 but not time 1 CCL-D was a significant predictor (βs = 
.53 and .50, respectively, ps < .01). In step 4, all previous variables plus the interaction 
between condition and time 2 CCL-D scores were entered. The change in R2 was less 
than .01 and nonsignificant for physician visits (p = .41), worry (p = .88), problem 
appraisals (p = .71). Note that steps 3 and 4 were significant (p < .05) when predicting 
physician visits until a multivariate point of influence was removed. In summary, no 
evidence emerged to support the hypothesis that disclosure would affect depressive 
cognitions or that such cognitions would mediate the effects of disclosure. However, 
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depressive cognitions did have significant unique associations with worry and problem 
appraisals.  
  The same analysis as above was conducted with CCL-A scores. Again, in 
separate series of regression analyses predicting each of the three main outcome 
variables, the time 1 measure of that variable was entered in the first step and condition 
was entered in the second step. In step 3, time 1 and time 2 CCL-A scores were entered. 
The change in R2 was nonsignificant when predicting physician visits (∆R2 =.03, p = .19), 
although it was significant when predicting worry and problem appraisals (∆R2 = .18 and 
.25, ps < .001). For the latter two variables, time 2 but not time 1 CCL-A significantly 
predicted worry (β = .45, p < .001) and problem appraisals (β = .35, p < .02). Note that 
step 3 was significant for physician visits until two points of influence were removed. In 
step 4, all previous variables plus interaction terms were entered. The change in R2 was 
nonsignificant when predicting physician visits, worry, and problem appraisals (∆R2 < 
.03, ps > .45). Note that removing one point with a high SDFBETA in the problem 
appraisal analysis did not meaningfully impact the results. Thus, no evidence emerged to 
support the hypothesis that disclosure would influence anxious cognitions or that such 
cognitions would mediate the effects of disclosure. However, anxious cognitions did have 
significant unique associations with worry and problem appraisals.  
Consistency of Writing Topic 
 41.4% of participants in the two worry conditions combined wrote about the same 
worry topic on all four days, whereas 58.6% wrote about two or more topics. In the two 
object conditions, only 11.7% wrote about the same object across all four days, whereas 
88.3% changed topics at least once. The first analyses examined whether topic 
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consistency moderated outcomes. The second set of analyses examined mediation of any 
such moderation.  
 In a two-way ANOVA, time 1 worry was entered as a covariate and condition and 
topic consistency were entered as fixed factors to predict time 2 worry. Main effects and 
the interaction between condition and consistency were explored. Although the effects of 
time 1 worry, F (1, 116) = 77.87, p < .01, and topic consistency, F (1, 116) = 4.44, p < 
.01, were significant, the effect of the interaction was not, F (3, 116) = 2.65, p = .13. 
However, when a case with a high Cook’s distance value was removed, the effects of the 
covariate and topic consistency remained significant while the interaction between 
consistency and condition became significant. (See Table 25 for ANOVA statistics.) Note 
that the effect of consistency was driven by significantly lower worry scores at time 2 for 
those who wrote about the same (M = -0.303, Standard Error = 0.182) than those who 
wrote about two or more topics (M = 0.118, Standard Error = 0.083). ANOVAs were 
conducted separately by group to explore the nature of the interaction. Writing about the 
same topic was related to lower trait worry one month later than writing about multiple 
topics in the emotional writing/worry and objective writing/object conditions, Fs (1, 29) 
> 5.32, ps < .03, both eta2s = .17. Thus, as expected, participants experienced reductions 
in worry if they wrote emotionally about the same worry across writing sessions, 
although the objective writing/object condition finding was unexpected. Topic 
consistency did not affect worry in the other two conditions, Fs = < 1. 
Table 25 
Analysis of Variance for Time 2 Worry with Time 1 Worry, Condition and, Topic 
Consistency as Predictors 
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Source df F η P 
 
Time 1 Worry  
Condition 
Consistency 






























Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
 Two separate ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effects of consistency, 
writing condition, and their interaction on physician visits (after entering time 1 visits as 
a covariate) and problem appraisals. (See Tables 26 and 27.) The only significant 
predictor of time 2 physician visits was time 1 physician visits. Note that removal of two 
points with high Cook’s distance and standardized residual values did not meaningfully 
impact the results. In addition, no variables significantly predicted problem appraisals. 
Thus, in contrast to the worry analyses, the physician visit and problem appraisals 
analyses revealed no moderating role of topic consistency. 
Table 26 
Analysis of Variance for Problem Appraisals with Condition and Topic Consistency as 
Predictors 
Source df F η P 


























Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
Table 27 
Analysis of Variance for Time 2 Physician Visits with Time 1 Physician Visits, Condition 
and, Topic Consistency as Predictors 
Source df F η P 
 





































Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
 The next analyses examined the effects of topic consistency, condition, and their 
interaction on the hypothesized mediators. The first analysis examined whether 
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consistency moderated the effect of condition on negative affect at day 1 or 4 and 
whether it moderated the change in negative affect from days 1 to 4. Thus, condition and 
consistency were entered as between-participants predictors and time was entered as a 
within-participants predictor. All two- and three-way interactions between the three 
predictors were included. No effects reached significance (Fs < 1.42, ps > .24) except 
that the effects of time and condition were significant (as reported earlier). These effects 
indicated that negative affect was highest in the emotional writing/worry condition and 
decreased across sessions in all conditions. Removing one case with a high Cook’s 
distance did not meaningfully impact the results.  
Next, identical separate analyses were performed replacing day 1 and day 4 
negative affect with day 1 and day 4 scores for causal, insight, and concreteness ratings. 
No variables significantly affected causal word use (ps > .14). However, after removing 
two cases with high Cook’s distance values, the effect of consistency became significant 
(p < .03). Contrary to expectations, participants who wrote about multiple topics (M = 
1.30, SE = 0.06) used more causal words than did participants who wrote about the same 
topic (M = 0.95, SE = 0.15), F (1, 105) = 5.62, p < .03, eta2 = .05. Also contrary to 
hypotheses, this effect of consistency was not moderated by time or condition, F (3, 105) 
= .16, p = .92. 
All variables were nonsignificant predictors of insight word use, Fs < 1.70, ps > 
.17, except for the effect of condition. As reported earlier, participants in the objective 
writing/object condition used significantly fewer insight words than did those in the other 
three conditions. Removing two cases with high Cook’s distance values did not 
meaningfully influence the results. No variables were significant predictors of 
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concreteness (Fs < .93, ps > .34) except for condition (as reported earlier) consistency (p 
< .04). As reported earlier, the effect of condition was driven by more concrete writing in 
the objective writing/object condition than in the other three conditions. The effect of 
consistency lost significance (p = .21) after two cases with high Cook’s distance values 
were removed. In summary, the results did not support the hypothesis that writing 
emotionally about the same worry topic would lead to habituation or to increases in 
concreteness, insight, or causal word use.  
Linguistic analyses one-month post-writing 
 The next analyses examined whether the text participants’ used to describe their 
potential problems one month after participating in the experiment differed as a function 
of condition with regard to concreteness and use of insight and causal words. Coh-Metrix 
and rater assessed scores of concreteness were entered as dependent variables in a 
multivariate general linear model with writing condition as the independent variable. The 
effect of condition was nonsignificant, F (3,113) = .71, p > .64, indicating that all groups 
described their potential problems comparably with respect to concreteness.   
 LIWC causal word use scores were entered as the dependent variable in an 
ANOVA with condition as the independent variable. The effect of condition was 
nonsignificant, F (3, 111) = 1.81, p = .10. When the same analysis was repeated with 
insight as the dependent variable, the effect of condition was also nonsignificant, F (3, 
111) = 1.30, p = .28. Thus, the writing manipulation did not affect the extent to which 
participants used causal or insight words when describing their potential problems one 
month later.  
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Discussion 
 By integrating the imagery avoidance theory of worry and written emotional 
disclosure research, the present investigation examined whether written disclosure could 
help individuals to cope with problems worrying them and have beneficial psychological 
and physical health effects. The results did not support the hypotheses for main or 
mediating effects, although decreased trait worry did result from writing emotionally 
about the same worry. Although most studies have found beneficial effects of written 
emotional disclosure (Frattaroli , 2006; Harris, 2006; Smyth, 1998), many have not (Bell-
Pringle, Jurkovic, & Plate, 2004; Bower, Kemeny, Taylor, & Fahey, 2003; Broderick et 
al., 2004; Deters & Range, 2003; Earnhardt, Martz, Ballard, & Curtin, 2002; Freyd, Nest, 
& Allard, 2005; Gallan & Lafreniere, 2003; Gidron, et al., 1996; Gortner, Rude, & 
Pennebaker, 2006; Graybeal et al., 2002; Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Kloss & Lisman, 
2002; Koopman, Ismailji, Holmes, Classen, Palesh, & Wales, 2005; Kovac & Range, 
2002; Largo-Marsh & Spates, 1990; Marlow & Wagner, 1999; O'Connor, Allen, 
Kaszniak, 2005; Range, Kovac, & Marion, 2000; Schwartz & Drotar, 2004), suggesting 
that many factors, including writing topic, may moderate the effect of disclosure. The 
discussion examines the moderating role of writing topic and writing content consistency 
across days in the present research in the context of past research and theory. 
Subsequently, potential explanations for the present findings, the implications of these 
findings for worry and written emotional disclosure theories, and potential directions for 
future research are offered.  
Although there were no beneficial effects of emotional disclosure about worries, 
there was a decrease in worry one month post-writing for participants who had disclosed 
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emotionally about the same one worry (but not for those who had written about multiple 
worries). The moderating effect on trait worry of topic consistency is consistent with 
Sloan et al.’s (2005) findings and with emotional process theory. Specifically, according 
to the theory, exposure to the same feared stimulus on multiple occasions should be more 
likely to lead to habituation than should switching the exposure stimulus. This effect must 
be viewed cautiously, however, for four reasons. First, it did not extend to the other two 
main outcome variables (physician visits and problem appraisals). Second, topic 
consistency for the most part did not impact the proposed mediators in the hypothesized 
fashion. That is, writing emotionally about the same worry did not lead to more 
habituation, narrative formation, or concrete writing than did writing emotionally about 
different worries. Third, these mediators did not relate to outcomes differently as a 
function of topic consistency.  
However, regardless of topic consistency, there was an immediate increase and 
subsequent decrease (across sessions) in post-writing negative affect among emotional 
writing/worry participants. The finding that there was a decrease in worry only for those 
who had written about the same topic suggests that the decrease in negative affect may 
represent habituation for these participants while being the result of avoidant coping 
among participants who switched topics (as they may have been switching to avoid the 
distress of full exposure). However, if habituation had occurred for those who wrote 
about the same but not multiple worry topics, it should predict better outcomes only for 
the former group. This expectation was not supported, though, as habituation did not 
relate to outcomes for either group. Thus, the mechanism(s) behind the effect of topic 
consistency remain unclear and warrant future investigation.  
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Finally, topic consistency unexpectedly impacted long-term worry for participants 
who wrote objectively about objects as well such that lower worry was associated with 
writing about the same than different objects. It is possible that some participants in this 
condition wrote about objects that they were excessively attached to emotionally (e.g., 
gifts from a former romantic partner or a deceased relative). Perhaps writing objectively 
about the same object across writing sessions helped them to come to terms with their 
feelings about the object. It is noteworthy that concreteness increased across writing 
sessions in this condition. Perhaps writing objectively increased concreteness, which in 
turn decreased the extent of worry individuals experienced over the meaning of the 
interpersonal relationships represented by the object. This reasoning, however, is purely 
speculative. The potential moderating role of topic consistency requires further 
investigation.  
In contrast to the present findings, Sloan et al.’s analyses were consistent with an 
exposure framework. Specifically, reduced salivary cortisol response from the first to the 
final writing session (indicating habituation) predicted decreases in post-traumatic stress 
and depressive symptoms. (Note, however, that Sloan et al. did not examine whether the 
manipulation impacted the proposed mediator.) Thus, although it is possible that writing 
emotionally about the same worry does have beneficial effects, the above reasons 
highlight the possibility that the one moderating effect on trait worry in the present study 
was only a chance finding. Attempts to replicate this moderation would help to clarify 
this issue. Such attempts should also include assessments of the same mediators as in the 
present research. An experimental design comparable to Sloan et al.’s would also help to 
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clarify the potential causal role in worry writing of topic consistency on emotional 
processing and long-term outcomes.  
Despite the moderating role of topic consistency on long-term worry levels, most 
of the main and moderating effects did not support the hypotheses. Specifically, there 
were few beneficial effects of emotional disclosure on worry, physician visits, or problem 
appraisals. The discussion below attempts to integrate the present findings with previous 
research and current theoretical perspectives of emotional disclosure. 
One possibility is that thought-action fusion (TAF) biases may have interfered 
with the worry writing task. Recall that one component of the TAF bias is the tendency to 
believe that thinking about future anxiety-provoking events may increase the likelihood 
of their occurrence (Shafran et al., 1996). Along these lines, writing about potential 
problems may increase the perceived likelihood of these problems. Contrary to this 
reasoning, however, the probability estimate item of the problem appraisal question set 
was unrelated to experimental condition at both assessment times (ps > .84). Thus, 
potential TAF biases do not appear to explain the present findings. Further explanations 
of the present findings will rely instead on habituation and narrative formation views of 
disclosure, imagery avoidance theory of worry, and specific methodological issues.  
One proposed mechanism for the effects of emotional disclosure is exposure 
(Sloan & Marx, 2004; Sloan et al., 2005). In the present study, emotional processing was 
expected to occur only for the emotional writing/worry participants. Specifically, these 
participants were expected to experience an increase in negative affect immediately after 
the first writing session, indicating fear activation. This negative affect was expected to 
decrease across writing sessions, indicating habituation. Further, this decrease in negative 
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affect was expected to lead to beneficial outcomes (fewer physician visits, more adaptive 
problem appraisals, and less trait worry).  
Consistent with the emotional processing predictions, immediate post-writing 
negative affect was slightly higher for emotional disclosure/worry participants than for 
the other three groups, suggesting successful fear activation. Note, however, that the 
negative affect in this group was still fairly low (on a 1 to 4 scale, M = 2.12, SD = 0.86), 
indicating minimal fear activation. The data also indicated that negative affect decreased 
significantly across writing sessions, indicating habituation. However, this decrease was 
also minimal and was no larger for this group than for the other three groups. The general 
decrease across experimental conditions may indicate that participants habituated to the 
laboratory setting. The lack of a condition by day interaction suggests no habituation to 
the worry topic occurred for the emotional writing/worry group. The lack of such 
habituation is inconsistent with most studies (e.g., Lumley & Provenzano, 2003; Sloan et 
al., 2005), although consistent with Bernard et al.’s (2006) findings. One possibility is 
that written emotional disclosure had no beneficial long-term effects because it did not 
lead to emotional processing. (Potential explanations for the lack of emotional processing 
among disclosure participants are discussed later.) 
Pennebaker’s (1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999) cognitive processing model 
provides an alternative viewpoint from which to interpret the present findings. 
Pennebaker argues that an increased understanding and more adaptive appraisals of 
emotional experiences are key elements to our well-being. In other words, writing helps 
to organize complex emotional experiences and to view the experiences as more 
manageable. As a result, individuals are able to reach resolution with such experiences 
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and have a greater sense of predictability and control over their lives. As evidence of 
narrative formation, Pennebaker has found that increases in insight and causal word use 
from the first to the final writing session typically correspond to improvement in long-
term functioning for disclosure but not for control participants.  
There was minimal evidence, however, of a relation between writing and 
cognitive variables in the present study. Specifically, the manipulation did not affect the 
total number of causal words used or the change in causal words across writing sessions. 
Consistent with cognitive models, however, participants in the emotional writing/worry 
condition did use more insight words than did objective writing/object participants (the 
standard control group). Further, insight word use increased across writing sessions in the 
emotional writing/worry group, although it also did in all other writing conditions. 
Although it is tempting to conclude that the writing manipulation caused emotional 
writing/worry participants to gain insight, it is also possible that individuals are simply 
unlikely to use insight words when writing objectively about trivial topics.  
To clarify this issue, one month later, participants in all four conditions described 
their potential problems and the content of their text was analyzed. There were no 
differences in insight (or causal) word use at this point or in concreteness scores, 
suggesting that the emotional writing/worry group had not gained insight into their 
potential problems or formed a coherent narrative. Also, contrary to the Pennebaker 
(1997) findings, the change in insight and causal word use across writing sessions did not 
relate to any dependent measures. Thus, minimal support emerged for cognitive 
mediation of the effects of disclosure. Further, it is possible the writing manipulation did 
not lead to beneficial effects because it did not influence the hypothesized cognitive 
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processing mediators. Note that although most relevant studies have found support for 
these mediators, some have found cognitive variables and outcomes to be unrelated to 
each other (e.g., Burton & King, 2004). 
Another possibility is that the writing manipulation did not produce the 
hypothesized effects because it did not affect anxious and depressive cognitions. Beck 
and other cognitive therapists have argued that cognitions play a crucial role in the 
development of worry, anxiety, and other forms of psychopathology (e.g., Beck, Emery, 
& Greenberg 1985; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). There is now strong evidence 
that cognitions do play such a role and that psychotherapy based on modifying 
maladaptive cognitions can alleviate various forms of psychopathology (e.g., Salkovskis, 
1996a,b). In the present study, it was hypothesized that changes in anxious and 
depressive cognitions might partly mediate the long-term effects of writing. The findings 
did not support this hypothesis, however, as writing did not impact cognitions at the one-
month follow-up assessment. Whether such cognitions mediate the effects of other forms 
of written disclosure is unclear, however, as researchers have not yet examined such a 
hypothesis. Given the close connection between cognitions and emotional well-being, 
such a hypothesis may be worth investigating in future writing studies.   
It is unclear why the affective and cognitive processing data were consistent with 
mediation hypotheses in most past research but not in the present research. This 
discrepancy could be due to the nature of the writing task (worry writing) or to the use of 
different statistical analyses in the present research than in past research. Specifically, 
researchers have assessed the relation between proposed mediators and outcomes in past 
research and have generally found support for exposure and narrative formation 
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perspectives. However, as described above, they have not conducted full assessments of 
mediation in that they have not assessed whether the writing manipulation impacts the 
proposed mediators. Thus, it is possible that, consistent with the present worry writing 
results, emotional disclosure about traumas and other topics that researchers have 
investigated does not impact changes in insight or causal word use or negative mood. In 
this case, it would be difficult for researchers to argue that these variables do mediate the 
effects of emotional disclosure. The typical finding that these mediators tend to correlate 
with outcomes is consistent with mediational models but is nonetheless not a complete 
test of mediation. Thus, the present results highlight the need for more detailed analyses 
of mediating processes in future emotional disclosure research.  
Given the present findings, one might wonder why the writing manipulation did 
not lead to emotional processing or narrative formation. One possible reason is that the 
writing of emotional writing/worry participants may have contained minimal imagery and 
may have been too low in concreteness. Accessing vivid imagery and viewing a problem 
concretely are necessary components of fear activation and thus necessary components of 
emotional processing (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986; Stoeber, 1998, 2000). Likewise, it 
is possible that the reason participants in the two worry writing conditions did not gain 
insight into their potential problems is that they did not write concretely. It seems 
unlikely that writing in abstract, vague, global terms (e.g., “I worry I am a failure”) will 
lead individuals to gain insight into their potential problems or to form a coherent 
narrative.  
This reasoning raises the question of why participants’ writing evoked little 
imagery and was vague. The answer to this question may rely on Borkovec’s (1994) 
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avoidance theory of worry. Borkovec argues that individuals’ worries are low in imagery 
because such imagery is distressing. It is much less anxiety-provoking to think in 
abstract, low-imagery, vague terms about potential problems. The low negative affect 
scores of participants in the emotional writing/worry group, suggests that these 
participants were avoiding rather than accessing distressing imagery. Similarly, the 
finding of significantly less concrete writing in this condition than in the objective 
writing/object condition suggests that the worry participants may have used verbal 
abstraction to avoid distressing, concrete thoughts (and perhaps vivid imagery). Recall 
that this avoidance is problematic according to emotional process theory (Foa & Kozak, 
1986) because it prevents full exposure and habituation to the feared stimulus. Without 
full exposure to the entire fear structure (including imagery), a change in meaning and 
emotional processing will not occur. Thus, although Pennebaker’s (1997) written 
emotional disclosure paradigm may encourage emotional processing of traumatic 
experiences (Sloan & Marx, 2004; Sloan et al., 2005), it may be that full fear exposure to 
problems worrying individuals is too distressing without the guidance of a therapist.  
One might wonder why beneficial effects of trauma disclosure have emerged, 
given that a common response to trauma is avoidance (Craske, 1999). Two specific 
components of the standard disclosure instructions may help to explain why avoidance 
does not interfere with trauma writing but may still interfere with worry writing. First, the 
standard Pennebaker trauma disclosure instructions indicate, “What I would like to have 
you write about for the next four days is the most traumatic, upsetting experience of your 
entire life” (Pennebaker, 1994, p. 3). Because the intervention usually does not take place 
immediately after traumatic experiences, many participants may write about experiences 
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from the distant past. Given that Sudin and Horowitz’s (2003) meta-analysis revealed that 
avoidant coping decreases over time following traumatic experiences, many participants 
may be writing about “older” traumas that do not elicit intense avoidance efforts. In 
contrast, participants in the present study were instructed, “Think about potential future 
problems about which you are worried. Of these, which is the one that worries you the 
most?” They were then asked to write about this worry. Because participants likely 
selected concerns currently worrying them, avoidance efforts may have been high 
(Borkovec, 1994). This reasoning suggests that avoidance might be lower if participants 
were instructed to disclose “old” worries, or issues that once did but no longer do worry 
them.  
Second, the standard Pennebaker (1994) trauma disclosure instructions state, “In 
addition to a traumatic experience, you can also write about major conflicts or problems 
that you have experienced or are experiencing now” (Pennebaker, p. 3). Thus, many 
participants might not actually be writing about traumatic experiences. They may instead 
be writing about personal issues that do not elicit avoidance.  
Although avoidant coping may help to explain the ineffectiveness of disclosure 
about worries, it is also possible that methodological changes could enhance emotional 
processing even for worry writing and thus lead to beneficial writing outcomes. First, the 
effect of topic consistency could be manipulated as described earlier based on the 
hypothesis that writing about the same worry topic should aid emotional and cognitive 
processing. (See Sloan et al., 2005, as well.) Second, it may be beneficial to manipulate 
writing duration. Specifically, Borkovec et al. (1983) found that 15 min of worrying led 
to more negative thought intrusions than did no worrying or 30 min of worrying. 
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Although participants did not actually write in the Borkovec study, it is possible that 15 
min (the duration of writing in the present study) is not sufficient for fear habituation. 
Consistent with this reasoning, there was an increase in initial negative affect among 
emotional writing/worry participants but there was no more habituation among these than 
among participants in the other three groups. The 15 min duration was selected to be 
consistent with past research, although many studies have used up to 30 min of writing. 
(See Pennebaker, 1997, for a discussion.) Although Smyth’s (1998) meta-analysis found 
that length of writing sessions did not moderate the effects of writing, the Borkovec et al. 
finding suggests that writing about worries may be a special case in which writing 
duration is important. Thus, it may be worthwhile in future research to examine whether 
30 min of emotional writing about worries leads to emotional processing and has 
beneficial long-term effects on worry, physical health, and problem appraisals.  
Third, it is possible that writing instructions that facilitate exposure to 
disconfirming information might be more beneficial than the standard written disclosure 
instructions. For example, Salkovskis’ (1996b) argues that the four determinants of 
anxiety (presumably including worry) are the perceived (a) likelihood of, (b) awfulness 
or severity of, (c) external factors that would help the individual to avoid, and (d) ability 
to cope with, threatening events. Consistent with point (a), MacLeod, Williams, and 
Beckerian (1991) found that instructing individuals to write reasons about why a potential 
problem would not occur led to lower estimates of the likelihood of the potential problem 
than did writing about reasons why it might occur. However, the connection between 
these likelihood estimates and worry and the long-term effects of such a task are 
unknown. The finding does suggest the possibility, however, that a worry intervention 
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using the Pennebaker paradigm might yield beneficial outcomes if it were to emphasize 
explicitly one or more of the Salkovskis determinants of anxiety. Fourth, given the roles 
of imagery and concreteness in avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, 1994; Stober, 
2000), instructions that encourage imagery expression and concrete writing might yield 
beneficial outcomes. For example, imagery might be enhanced by instructing participants 
to engage in an imagery priming task in which they try to visualize their problem 
occurring. During the writing period, they might be instructed to write as concretely (in 
as much detail as possible) about what they had visualized during the imagery priming 
task.  
Additional Issues 
 A secondary aim of the present study was to remove the confound in previous 
research between the emotional valence of the writing topic and the emotional nature of 
the writing task. In the typical writing study, participants are assigned to write 
emotionally about an emotionally meaningful topic or to write neutrally about an 
emotionally neutral topic. It is thus unclear whether the emotional valence of the topic or 
the emotional nature of the writing (or both) accounts for long-term outcomes. Note that 
the Pennebaker and Beall (1986) study is a rare exception in that three of the four 
quadrants from Table 2 were included. (They included neutral writing about a traumatic 
experience.) Most studies, however, have included only the upper left and bottom right 
quadrants, leaving the precise nature of causation unclear. In addition, it is possible that 
neutral or objective writing may be helpful for some topics but not for others. As 
described earlier, topics that involve threat overestimation may be particularly suitable to 
neutral writing (perhaps from an outsider’s perspective), as such writing might aid 
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individuals to view the topic more objectively. Thus, the present study addressed these 
issues by using a fully crossed 2 x 2 design. (See Table 2.)  In addition, previous studies 
have provided control participants little guidance on how to write “factually” or 
“objectively,” even though instructions on how to express emotions are provided for the 
emotional disclosure group. Thus, the comparison control groups in the present study 
included detailed suggestions on how to write objectively in order to make the 
instructions more comparable to the emotional disclosure instructions.  
Because all four experimental groups were comparable on all outcome variables, 
the present study does little to disambiguate the extent to which beneficial effects of 
writing are due to the emotional valence of the writing topic versus the emotional valence 
of the writing instructions. The finding that the emotional writing/worry participants 
(who wrote about the same worry) were the only participants who experienced any 
beneficial effects (decreased trait worry) suggests that both the emotional valence of the 
topic and the emotional nature of the writing instruction are important. However, this 
effect must be viewed cautiously for the reasons previously listed. A fully crossed, 2 x 2 
design like that of the present study should be used in future studies investigating the 
effects of writing about topics that researchers have already found beneficial effects for in 
previous disclosure studies (e.g., traumatic experiences, life goals, the transition from 
high school to university, job loss). Future worry writing studies should also use the same 
2 x 2 design while implementing the potential modifications to the writing instructions 
described previously.  
 A related issue was whether writing nonemotionally or objectively would be a 
beneficial way to cope with potential problems individuals are worried about. Recall that 
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threat overestimation is a key component of Salkovskis’ (1996a,b) theory of anxiety. 
Thus, the present study examined whether attempting to help individuals to view threats 
from an outsider’s perspective would help to reduce worry (the objective writing/worry 
condition). There was no trace of beneficial effects of such writing. It is possible, 
however, that writing instructions that specifically target these factors might yield 
beneficial effects. For example, individuals could be encouraged to write (either 
objectively or emotionally) about reasons why a threat might not occur, might not be so 
severe, or might not be so difficult to cope with. They could, perhaps, focus on one of 
these factors during each of the writing sessions.  
It is also possible, however, that individuals can utilize their emotions and still be 
“objective” at the same time. Indeed, many functional accounts of emotion view emotion 
as an important source of information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2003). Further, objectivity 
would require taking into account all important, including affective, information. With 
this reasoning in mind, it may be beneficial for future investigations to encourage 
objectivity and emotion expression. These two factors could be combined implicitly by 
merely mentioning both objectivity and emotion expression in the instructions, or 
explicitly by encouraging individuals to utilize their emotional reactions as a valid source 
of information. 
Finally, the current findings are relevant to the interpretation of recent findings by 
the present author and colleagues (Markowitz, Purdon, & Oakman, 2007). Markowitz et 
al. have argued that in written emotional disclosure research, the standard control and 
disclosure groups may differ on five potential confounding variables. Specifically, 
compared to the control group, the disclosure group may have higher expectations of 
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improvement and may experience greater cognitive dissonance over not improving and 
greater perceived demand to improve. In addition, active emotion inhibition efforts and 
resentment over the writing task may be higher in the control group. Further, these five 
variables may in part account for the between-group outcome differences commonly 
reported in the disclosure literature. To test these hypotheses, Markowitz et al. randomly 
assigned 204 participants to read a description of the standard emotional disclosure, 
standard control, or a modified control writing task, after which they answered questions 
assessing their perceptions of the task with regard to these five variables. The modified 
control group was designed to control for the five variables. In this condition, instructions 
were clarified to reduce the likelihood of emotion inhibition and to increase perceived 
credibility. To achieve the latter goal, Markowitz et al. used “time management” 
instructions, as time management may appear more credible than writing about trivial 
topics (Pennebaker, 1994).  
An ANOVA with planned comparisons provided support for the hypotheses. 
Specifically, the standard control and disclosure groups differed significantly on all five 
variables in the hypothesized direction (although the effect on demand characteristics was 
only marginal, p = .086). Further, the modified control group did not differ from the 
standard disclosure group in expectancies and demand characteristics, suggesting these 
modifications would help to reduce the potential confounding impact of these two 
variables.  
The Markowitz et al. (2007) findings suggest that controlling for these five 
variables in disclosure research is important. Because the present study provided detailed 
instructions on how to write objectively and encouraged individuals to view meaningful 
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topics from the perspective of an outsider, it may have appeared more credible. This 
possibility is particularly strong for the objective writing/worry condition, as obtaining 
emotional distance from a worry might be viewed as beneficial. It is thus noteworthy that 
the emotional disclosure condition did not differ from any of the other three conditions. 
However, the extent to which the comparison conditions removed variance in the five 
potential confounds Markowitz et al. discuss is unknown, as these variables were not 
directly assessed in the present study. Admittedly, the present study was designed years 
before the Markowitz et al. findings. In future disclosure studies, researchers should 
assess participant perceptions of the writing task using questions comparable to 
Markowitz et al.’s to ensure that between-group outcome differences are independent of 
these variables. In addition, the present study did include an explicit emotion-avoidance 
instruction, which the Markowitz et al. findings suggest should be modified in control 
instructions in future research. Specifically, although control participants should still be 
instructed not to write about their emotions, it should be emphasized in future studies that 
they also should not effortfully avoid or suppress their emotions. 
Summary 
 Worry tends to serve an imagery avoidance function that is maladaptive in the 
long-run in that it prevents emotional processing. The present study attempted to address 
this problem by examining whether emotional processing of feared potential problems 
could be enhanced via emotional disclosure. Although there was a beneficial effect on 
trait worry among emotional disclosure participants who wrote about the same worry, 
most findings did not support the idea that emotional disclosure would enhance emotional 
processing.  
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 It is possible that emotional processing did not occur because individuals did not 
fully engage in the writing task or because the writing instructions did not elicit sufficient 
imagery and sufficiently concrete writing, which in turn may have prevented cognitive 
and emotional processing. With these ideas in mind, several methodological changes are 
recommended for future research, all of which involve altering the content and/or 
duration of writing. 
Conclusions 
 We all worry at times. Yet for some people, this worry is so extreme that it 
interferes with their quality of life. Despite the pervasiveness of worry, some researchers 
initially questioned the utility of studying worry scientifically (O’Neil, 1985a,b). Three 
decades of research, however, have demonstrated the utility of such research. Indeed, 
several existing psychotherapy and psychopharmacological treatments now exist for 
worry, generalized anxiety, and the anxiety disorders. It is hoped that researchers will 
continue to investigate pharmacological and psychological (including writing) treatment 
methods for individuals suffering from excessive worry.  
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Footnotes 
1The data were also analyzed with three effect-coded variables: one for the emotional 
valence of the writing instruction (emotional vs. objective), one for the emotional valence 
of the writing topic (worry vs. object), and one for the interaction of these two variables. 
The results did not differ meaningfully in any analyses with this approach. The data are 
reported using dummy coding because this approach conveniently allows readers to 
compare the means of each condition with that of the standard control condition in 
disclosure research (the objective writing/object condition) by examining the statistical 
significance of the regression coefficients for each vector.  
2Whether the time 1 covariate interacted with experimental condition was examined for 
each dependent measure. In no case did such an interaction reach statistical significance 
(all ps > .05). 
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Appendix A: Appraisal of Potential Problem 
 
DIRECTIONS: Please CIRCLE your answer to each question. 
 
1. How worried are you about this situation?  
 




         Very 
worried
 
2.   How bad would the consequences be if this situation actually happened?  
 




         The most 
terrible 
consequences 
I can imagine 
 
3.   The probability that the situation will occur is about: 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
4.   If this situation happened, I would be able to cope with the consequences: 
 




         Very 
well 
 
5.   If this situation happened, people (friends, family, etc.) would be able to help me deal 
with it: 
 











Appendix B: Concreteness and Imagery Ratings 
 
Taken from J. Stober, February 9, 2004, personal communication; modified 
slightly for present purposes. 
 






















Explications and Guidelines Regarding Concreteness Ratings 
 
Category Further explications/Examples 
1 Abstract concepts without any extensions/details; broad, general 
“phrases.” 
2 Abstract concepts with some detail, but still rather vague and unclear 
3 Neutral 
4 Sequences with details and concrete examples, rather clear and decided 
(e.g., with definite articles or possessive pronouns) 
5 Concrete examples with details such as person, time, or place involved 
 
Some Standard Ratings/Examples 
 
• Events/actions (e.g., a fight, an argument) are rather definite and should be 
given ratings closer to the concrete end of the continuum. 
• Traits/hypothetical constructs (e.g., insecurity, self-doubts, lazy, etc.) are 
rather aggregated and cross-situational and should be given ratings closer 
to the abstract end of the continuum. 
• Insecurity markers such as “somehow,” “perhaps,” etc., are additions that 
make statements less concrete and should be given ratings closer to the 




Background Information for Raters: 
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An important feature of words is their imagery value. Words differ in their capacity to 
arouse mental images of things or events. Some words may arouse images very quickly 
and easily, whereas other words may do so only with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay). 
For example, think of the two words “apple” and “democracy.” In most persons, the first 
word would evoke a mental image rather easily and fast, whereas imagery for the second 
word would be more difficult and more slowly. 
 
Also sentences differ with respect to imagery. Consider again our previous examples: 
(1) Today, I will drive to Philadelphia and go shopping.  
(2) Maybe something bad will happen. 
 
In most persons, the first sentence would evoke imagery rather fast and easily, whereas 





Please give each sentence in the problem elaboration chart of each participant a rating for 
imagery, using the following scale from 1 to 5:  
 
Evokes a mental image... 
 
1 2 3 4 5 






neither/nor moderately easily 
and fast 




Appendix C: Topic Identification 
 
Identification of Worry 
 
Instructions: Please think about potential future problems about which you are worried. 
Of these, which is the one that worries you the most? Ideally, we would like you to write 
about a situation that you have not discussed in great detail with other people. Please 














Identification of Important Object 
 
Instructions: Please take a moment to think about the objects in your room or home. 
Which one is the most important and meaningful to you? Ideally, we would like you to 
write about an object that you have not discussed in great detail with other people. Please 















Appendix D: Writing Instructions for Each Experimental Condition 
 
Written emotional disclosure—Worry 
 
On each day of this study, we will give you a writing assignment on the worry you 
identified earlier. For the next fifteen minutes, we would like you to write about this 
worry. In your writing, we want you to really let go and explore your very deepest 
emotions and thoughts. You might tie the worry you write about to other parts of your 
life. For example, how is it related to your childhood, your parents, people you love, who 
you are, and who you want to be? In addition, you may choose to write about what might 
happen or what the consequences might be if the situation you are worried about were to 
occur. Or you might write about what factors might make the situation more (or less) 
likely to occur. Whatever you choose to write, however, it is critical that you really delve 
into your deepest emotions and thoughts. 
 
If you feel you have fully expressed your feelings about this potential problem before the 
15 minutes is up and have nothing left to write about, you may write about a different 





On each day of this study, we will give you a writing assignment on the worry you 
identified earlier. For the next fifteen minutes, we would like you to write about this 
worry. However, we do not want you to let go and explore your deepest emotions and 
thoughts. Instead, we want you to be as objective and factual as possible. For example, 
how would this situation be viewed from the perspective of an outsider or a person 
unfamiliar with your situation? How would an objective bystander report the details and 
facts of the situation to someone else? Objectively speaking, what factors would make the 
problem better or worse? Whatever you choose to write, however, it is critical that you be 
as objective and factual as possible. 
 
If you feel you have fully expressed your feelings about this potential problem before the 
15 minutes is up and have nothing left to write about, you may write about a different 
worry. Again, please be sure that you be as objective as possible and avoid delving into 
your deepest emotions and thoughts altogether.   
 
Written emotional disclosure—Neutral Topic 
 
On each day of this study, we will give you a writing assignment on the important object 
you identified earlier. For the next fifteen minutes, we would like you to write about this 
object. In your writing, we want you to really let go and explore your very deepest 
emotions and thoughts. You might try to relate the object to other aspects of your life. For 
example, how is it related to your childhood, your parents, people you love? What does it 
say about your personality, your interests, who you are, and who you want to be? In 
addition, what might happen or what might the consequences be if you were to lose this 
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object? Whatever you choose to write, however, it is critical that you really delve into 
your deepest emotions and thoughts. 
 
If you feel you have fully expressed your feelings about this object before the 15 minutes 
is up and have nothing left to write about, you may write about different objects in your 
room/home. Again, please be sure that you really delve into your deepest emotions and 
thoughts. 
 
Objective Writing—Neutral topic 
 
On each day of this study, we will give you a writing assignment on the important object 
you identified earlier. For the next fifteen minutes, we would like you to write about this 
object. However, we do not want you to let go and explore your deepest emotions and 
thoughts. Instead, we want you to be as objective and factual as possible. For example, 
how would this object be described from the perspective of an outsider? How would an 
objective bystander describe the details and facts of the object to someone else? 
Objectively speaking, what might be the consequences if you were to lose this object? 
Whatever you choose to write, however, it is critical that you be as objective and factual 
as possible. 
 
If you feel you have fully expressed your feelings about this object before the 15 minutes 
is up and have nothing left to write about, you may write about different objects in your 
room/home. Again, please be sure that you be as objective as possible and avoid delving 
into your deepest emotions and thoughts altogether. 
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Appendix E: Instructions for Potential Problem  
Descriptions at One-Month Follow-Up Assessment 
 
For the next five minutes, we would like you to write about your worry. You are free to 
write about any aspects of the situation, such as your emotions about it, the consequences 
that there might be if the situation were to occur, factors that might make the situation 
more or less likely to occur, or how you might manage to cope with the situation. You 
might tie the problem you write about to other parts of your life. For example, how is it 
related to your childhood, your parents, people you love, who you are, and who you want 
to be? You may also try to describe the situation objectively and factually, perhaps by 
taking the perspective of an outsider or someone unfamiliar with the situation. For 
instance, how might an outsider describe this situation to someone else? 
 
